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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICK L. STONEHOCKER, 
Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
vs. 
JACQUELINE F.M. STONEHOCKER, 
Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
Appellate Court No. 20060292 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this case is vested with the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(h) (as amended, 1996). 
REFERENCE TO PARTIES 
For purpose of clarity Rick L. Stonehocker, the Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-
Appellee shall hereinafter be referred to as Husband. Jacqueline F.M. Stonehocker, the 
Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant shall hereinafter be referred to as Wife. (Rule 
24(d) Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
HUSBAND'S ISSUES 
I. In awarding attorney fees in the sum of $25,000 in favor of the Wife, the trial court 
as a matter of law erred in its failure to enter any findings supporting the award. 
II. In awarding the Wife specific property: 
l 
A. The trial court erred factually in awarding $46,000 to the Husband as premarital 
property and then offsetting that award against the line of credit on the family 
home in the sum of $44,990 based upon no findings. 
B. The trial court erred in failing to address the issue of equity in the West Haven, 
Utah home. 
C. The trial court erred in awarding the Wife the 1998 Volkswagen Passat even 
though it was property of Stoney Motors, which was awarded exclusively to the 
Husband. 
D. The trial court failed to address the issue of rent received by the Wife during 
the course of the separation. 
E. The trial court should have set a specific date to terminate the Husband's 
obligation to pay the first mortgage or line of credit on the parties' residence 
following the issuance of the Memorandum Decision dated July 5, 2006. 
III. Whether or not the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure in that the findings issued by this court in support of these orders is 
insufficient as a matter of law for the Husband to have a meaningful review before 
this court. 
WIFE'S ISSUES 
I. The Husband failed to marshal evidence supporting the Trial Court's findings. 
II. The Court erred in failing to award the Wife an interest in the business, Stoney 
Motors. (F. of Fct. f 9, 16, and 24) 
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III. The Court erred in failing to require the Husband to pay one-half (Yi) of the 
$52,000.00 loan owed to Carl Manzel. (F. of Fct. % 73, 74, 76 & 77) 
IV. The Wife should be awarded attorney's fees on appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Trial Courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony and property 
distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Findings of Fact in divorce appeals are subject to the 
clearly erroneous standard of review. Conclusions of Law are viewed for correctness and 
given no special deference on appeal. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 
App. 1991) 
The clearly erroneous standard of review applies to the Husband's issues. The 
standard of no special deference applies to paragraphs II & III of the Wife's issues. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Husband and the Wife appealed from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce which was signed by Judge Jones on the 28th day of 
December 2005 and entered with the Clerk of the Court on the 3rd day of January 2006. 
The Trial continued over a three-month period of time. The dates of the trial were April 
4, 7, 8; May 19, 20, 27; June 14 and 17 of 2005. The Court issued a Memorandum 
Decision signed by Judge Jones on the 5th day July 2005. The Wife filed a Motion for 
Clarification and Modification of Order on the 10th day of August 2005 with a Supporting 
Memorandum. The Husband filed a Motion to Clarify and to Review the Memorandum 
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Decision on the 11 day of August 2005. The Trial Court heard both Motions on the 21st 
day of September 2005 and made Findings of Fact and Rulings in open court. 
(September 21, 2005 Tr. 1:5 - 1:13). Thereafter, the Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were entered. (Addendum to Husband's 
Brief, sections 2 and 3) 
The Trial Court found that the Husband had invested $46,000.00 of his pre-marital 
property in the West Haven, Utah home and thereafter, he had obtained $45,000.00 from 
a line of credit against the West Haven home which he transferred into the business, 
"Stoney Motors". (F of Fct. f 25, 35, 36, and 42) The Court found that the Wife's father 
built the West Haven home for his daughter and gifted to her as her inheritance 
$90,000.00 worth of value in the home. (September 21, 2005, Tr. 10:22 - 11:4) The 
Court found that the West Haven home was appraised at $455,000.00 with a first 
mortgage against said home in the sum of $328,765.00 and an equity line of credit against 
the home in the sum of $44,900.00, resulting in an equity of $81,245.00. (F. of Fct. ^ 33, 
34, & 35) The Trial Court awarded the home to the Wife and required the Wife to pay 
the first mortgage and the line of credit against the West Haven home. The Court's order 
the Wife to assume the line of credit which was a full satisfaction of the Husband 
premarital investment in the West Haven home of approximately $46,000.00. (F. of Fct.f 
42) The Court ruled that the Husband's obligation to pay the first mortgage and the line of 
credit which was created by an Order from the Domestic Relations Commissioner would 
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remain in full force and effect until the date of the Decree of Divorce. (September 21, 
2005 Tr. 65:8 & 9, 66:14) 
The Court found that the Husband owns a used car dealership known as "Stoney 
Motors" which was created in 2001. The business is a Limited Liability Company (LLC) 
and the Wife is listed as 50% owner in said business. (F. of Fct.^ f 7, 9, & 10). The Court 
found that the dealership had been valued at $200,000.00 by the Wife's accountant and 
$100,000.00 by the Husband's accountant. (F. of Fct.lj 14 & 15) The Court found that the 
business is in reality a sole proprietorship of the Husband, that he is not retired and the 
business has not been sold, and therefore, it would not be equitable to require award the 
Wife part of the value of the business which the Court described as good will. (F. of Fct.lj 
17, 18, 19, & 20) The Wife asserts that she should be awarded one-half (Vi) of the value 
of the business. 
The Court found that all debts incurred during the marriage and before the time of 
separation will be divided equally, regardless of who took out the debt or loan; that the 
Husband knew about the debts that were incurred during the course of the marriage; that 
the parties separated three times during the marriage and reconciled each time with the 
exception of the last separation; and that the Husband forgave the Wife for any debts 
incurred during the first and second separation and thus those debts become marital debts 
to be divided equally. (F. of Fct.lj 72, 73, 74, 75, & 76) In spite of those Findings, the 
Court required the Wife to be solely responsible for paying the debt owed to her father in 
the sum of $52,000.00. (F. of Fct-t 77) The Wife contends that the $52,000.00 loan from 
5 
her father was used to pay off indebtedness incurred by the parties during the course of 
the marriage and the Husband should be required to pay one-half (V2) of that loan. The 
Wife contends the Court's ruling that she is solely responsible for the $52,000.00 loan is a 
Conclusion of Law to be reviewed by this Court for correctness and given no special 
deference. 
The Wife asserts that the Husband's issues on appeal are without merit and are not 
supported by the evidence and the Findings of the Court and therefore, the Husband's 
appeal should be denied. The Wife asserts that she should be granted relief on her issues 
of appeal and that she is not required to marshal the evidences as to her issues on appeal 
because she has not challenged the Trial Court's Finding of Fact, but merely its 
Conclusions of Law. Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1999) 
The Wife was awarded attorney's fees by the Trial Court. (F. of Fct. f^ 111) The 
Wife asserts that she should be awarded attorney's fees for the maintenance of this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married on April 25, 1998 and maintained a marriage relationship 
for approximately seven years (F. of Fct. f 2, Husband's Addendum Sec. 2) 
2. The parties had separated and reconciled several times; April 2001, October 2002, 
and June 2003 (F. of Fct. f 3). 
6 
3. A divorce petition was filed on September 30, 2003 (F. of Fct. Tf 4). 
4. A Pre-Trial Order was entered by the Domestic Relations Commissioner on May 25, 
2004 certifying the issues for trial. (Wife's Addendum Sec 1) 
5. The Wife is employed and currently earns $4,000 a month in net income (F. of Fct. f^ 
60). 
6. The Wife's monthly expenses were $7,125 (F. of Fct. Tf 62). 
7. The Husband is the owner of Stoney Motors, LLC, which is a used car dealership, 
and earns $10,000 per month (F. of Fct. ^ 63). 
8. The Husband had monthly expenses of $7,311.53 (F. of Fct. Tf 65) 
9. The Husband owns a used car dealership called "Stoney Motors, LLC" and its 
assets. The business was established in 2001 (F. of Fct. f 7 and 8). 
10. The Wife is listed on the LLC as a 50% owner of Stoney Motors, LLC, although she 
was not involved in the day-to-day operations of the business, and only did some 
billing and paperwork for the dealership several years prior to the trial (F. of Fct. f 
10, 11 and 12). 
11. The dealership was valued by Wife's accountant, Charles Ulrich, at $200,000 and by 
Altina Stott, the Husband's accountant at $100,000 (F. of Fct. ^ 14 and 15) 
12. The trial court found that professional reputation such as the Husband's could be 
valued, but unless the professional retires and the business is sold, his reputation 
should not be treated any differently from a professional or advanced degree (F. of 
Fct. Tf 20 and Memorandum Decision j^ 20). 
7 
13. On November 27, 2000, a line of credit was acquired against the West Haven home 
in the sum of $45,000, which was transferred into Stoney Motors' business account 
in May 2001, which is an indebtedness of Stoney Motors, LLC (F. of Fct. ^ 25). 
14. The Wife was not awarded any interest in the Stoney Motors, LLC business. (F of 
Fct % 24) 
15. The Court found that each party should pay one-half (Vi) of all the debts incurred 
during the marriage up to the date of separation. (F. of Fct. j^ 73) 
16. The parties incurred a debt to the Wife's father during the course of the marriage and 
prior to the date of separation in the sum of $52,000.00. (Vol VI Tr. 1090:10 -
1092:22) The Court required the Husband to pay the entire debt. (F. of Fct. f^ 77) 
17. The parties built a home in West Haven, Utah in 2001 which was appraised at 
$455,000.00 (F. of Fct. ^ 31, 32 and 33). 
18. At the time of the divorce, there was a first mortgage balance in the name of the 
Husband of $328,765, and an equity line balance of $44,990. (F. of Fct. ^ 34 and 35) 
19. There existed $81,344 of equity by subtracting the first mortgage and the line of 
credit from the appraised value of $455,000 (F. of Fct. ^ 20 and 21). 
20. The Wife's father was the contractor that built the home and contributed $90,000.00 
to the home as an inheritance and/or gift to the Wife. (September 21, 2005 Tr. 10:22 
-11:4) 
21. The Husband invested $46,000.00 of his premarital assets purchasing the lot on 
which the West Haven, Utah home was located (F. of Fct f 39). 
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22. The Wife was awarded the home and its equity and was required to pay the first 
mortgage and the $45,000.00 charged on the line of credit and to refinance the home 
so as to remove those indebtedness from the Husband's name. (Decree of Divorce ^ | 
6, Husband's Addendum Sec. 3) 
23. The Wife's obligation to pay off the line of credit which was business debt fully 
satisfied the Husband's premarital interest in the home of approximately $46,000.00 
(State of Facts U 42) 
24. The Husband incurred attorney's fees, and costs of $33,279.27, and the Wife 
incurred attorney's fees and costs of $35,979 (F. of Fct. ^fl07). 
25. The Wife requested the trial court award her attorney's fees and costs, and the 
Husband was ordered to pay $25,000 of the Wife's attorney's fees, court costs and 
accountant's fees (F. of Fct. ^ 105, 107, 108 and 111). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I 
The Trial Court's Findings of Fact are sufficient to support the decisions which are 
appealed by the Husband. 
The Trial Court made written Findings of Fact. Thereafter, both parties filed 
Motions and the Court conducted a hearing on September 21, 2005. At that time, the 
Court made Findings in Open Court. The written findings and the findings made in Open 
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Court are sufficient to support the Court's decision on the issues being appealed by the 
Husband. 
II 
The Husband failed to marshal the evidence supporting the Trial Court's Findings. 
The Husband's appeal challenges the Court's Findings of Fact and/or the Court 
failure to make Findings of Fact. When Findings of Fact are being challenged a party has 
the duty to marshal all of the evidence to support the Court's findings. This Court 
assumes that the Trial Court record supports the Findings when an Appellant has failed to 
marshal the evidence. The Husband in this case has not made any attempt to marshal the 
evidence to support the Findings made by the Trial Court and therefore, this Court should 
affirm the Trial Court's Findings and Decree as it relates to the Husband's issues on 
appeal. 
Ill 
The Trial Court's Findings Justified the Awarding of Attorney's Fees to the Wife. 
The Trial Court entered the appropriate findings to meeting the requirements of 
showing the need of the Wife, the ability to pay by the Husband; the reasonableness of 
the fees; and the fact that the Wife had substantially prevailed on part of her claim. Both 
Attorneys agreed to proffer the amount and reasonableness of the attorney's fees and the 
Court accepted the proffer and the attorney's fee exhibits. Consequently, the Court's 
award of attorney's fees should be sustained. 
IV 
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The Trial Court did not error in Ruling on the Husband's $46,000.00 premarital 
interest in the home and the $45,000.00 line of credit placed on the home by the 
Husband and used in the business. 
The Trial Court found that the Husband invested $46,000.00 of his pre-marital 
assets in the West Haven home. The Court also found that shortly thereafter the Husband 
took $45,000.00 out of the home through a line of credit and placed it in his business 
Stoney Motors. The $45,000.00 is still listed as a business debt of Stoney Motors. The 
Court awarded the home to the Wife, but required her to pay both the first mortgage and 
the line of credit. This resulted in the Husband received $45,000.00 which was transferred 
from the home to the business. This fully satisfied the husband's pre-marital investment 
in the home. The Court made specific findings on this issue and the Court's Findings 
were supported by testimony and evidence received during the course of the Trial. 
V 
The Trial Court did not commit error and did address the equity in the West 
Haven, Utah home. 
The home was appraised at $455,000.00. The Wife was required to pay the first 
mortgage in the sum of $328,765.00, and the balance owed on the line of credit in the 
sum of $44,990.00. This resulted in equity in the home of $81,245.00. The Court found 
that the Wife's father, Carl Manzel, built the home for his daughter as the general 
contractor. The Court found that the value of Mr. Manzel's work was $90,000.00, which 
Mr. Manzel gifted to the Wife as her inheritance. Mr. Manzel also testified that he 
performed additional labor for which he was not compensated in the approximate sum of 
l i 
$50,000.00 to $60,000.00. The Court found that Mr. Manzel's contribution of $90,000.00 
was a gift to the Wife and that the sum exceeded the remaining equity in the West Haven 
home. The Court made findings on these issues and the evidence supports the Findings. 
VI 
The Trial Court's awarding of the 1998 Volkswagen Passat to the Wife was 
supported by the Findings and the evidence and was within the discretion of the 
Trial Court. 
The Trial Court found that the personal property should be equally divided between 
the parties. The Trial Court made Findings related to the division of the personal property 
and found that the Wife should be awarded the 1998 Volkswagen Passat automobile and 
that the Husband should be awarded the Cabo San Lucas timeshare. Both the Husband 
and his counsel acknowledged during the trial that the Volkswagen Passat was a marital 
asset. The Court made Findings concerning the division of the personal property and the 
evidence received by the Court supports those Findings. 
VII 
The Trial Court was not required to address the issue of Rent received by the Wife. 
The rent issue was not certified as an issue in the Pre-Trial Order and the Husband 
did not raise that issue during his closing arguments before the Judge. The Husband 
missed his opportunity to have that issue considered by the Court and should not be able 
to raise the issue at this time on Appeal. 
VIII 
The Trial Court did not fail to set a termination date regarding the Husband's 
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obligation to pay the first mortgage and Line of Credit. 
The Domestic Relations Commissioner issued an Order requiring the Husband to 
pay the first mortgage and the balance owed on the line of credit in lieu of alimony. That 
Order remained in place until the final Decree of Divorce was entered by the Trial Judge. 
The Trial Court addressed this issue in the September 21, 2005 hearing. The Trial Court 
stated that the Husband's obligation to pay the first mortgage and the line of credit would 
remain in force until the Decree of Divorce was signed and filed with the Clerk of the 
Court. The Court's ruling is supported by the both the evidence and Utah Law. 
IX 
The Trial Court erred in failing to Award Wife an interest in the business Stoney 
Motors. 
The Trial Court found that the parties created a business known as Stoney Motors 
during the course of their marriage. The Wife was a 50% owner of the Limited Liability 
Company. The Court found that the value of the business was between $100,000.00 to 
$200,000.00. The Court found that there was no basis for the Husband's claim of 
Dissipation of assets during the course of the marriage; that no exceptional circumstances 
existed for an unequal division of the marital assets and all property owned or purchased 
during the marriage should be divided equally. The Court then refused to awarded the 
Wife any interest in the Stoney Motors business because the value was primarily 
goodwill. The Court concluded that it could not awarded the Wife a portion of the 
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business created during the marriage because the Husband had not retired and no actual 
sale had been made of the business. 
The Wife contends that the Court inappropriately interrupted the Supreme Court's 
ruling in the case oi Sorenson v. Sorenson 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992). This Court has 
held on a number of occasions that assets acquired during a marriage are to be divided 
equally, except under exceptional circumstances. The Court's Finding that the properties 
acquired during the marriage should be divided equally between the parties clearly 
demonstrates that the Court made no Findings of exceptional circumstances. The 
Husband was not required to pay alimony and child support as was the case in Sorenson 
and therefore, the value of the business even if it did consist primarily of goodwill should 
have been divided equally with the Wife. 
X 
The Trial Court erred in failing to require the Husband to pay one-half (1/2) of the 
$52,000.00 loan owed to Carl Manzel. 
The Court found that any debts incurred by the parties during the marriage and 
before separation will be divided equally regardless of who took out the debt or loan. The 
Court then required the Wife to be solely responsible for a loan from her father in the sum 
of $52,000.00 which was used to pay debts incurred by the parties during the marriage 
and prior to their separation. The Court found that there was insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the Wife had hidden or diverted assets. The Court also found that there 
was no exceptional circumstances which would justify an unequal division of the marital 
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property. The Court did not find that the $52,000.00 was a debt incurred after the date of 
separation. The evidence clearly demonstrates that it was a debt incurred during the 
marriage to pay off indebtedness of the parties, which were incurred during the marriage. 
The Court's failure to require both parties to pay one-half (1/2) of this debt is contrary to 
the Court's Findings and is not supported by the evidence. 
XI 
The Wife should be awarded attorney's fees on appeal. 
The Wife was awarded attorney's fees by the Trial Court. The Wife believes that 
she should substantially prevail on appeal and therefore, this Court should award her 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
The Trial Court's Findings or Fact are sufficient to support the Decisions which are 
appealed by the Husband. 
The Husband in his brief under section III of his argument alleges that the Findings 
of Fact are insufficient to support the Trial Court's conclusion of law. As will be 
demonstrated in response to each of the arguments in his brief, the Court made specific 
Findings of Fact which support its decisions. Those Findings of Fact consist of the 
findings in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law signed by the Court and findings 
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made by the Court during a hearing held on September 21, 2005. After the Court entered 
a Memorandum Decision, the Wife filed a Motion for Clarification and Modification of 
Order and a Supporting Memorandum on August 10, 2005. The Husband filed a Motion 
to Clarify and to Review on August 18, 2005. Both of these Motions were heard by the 
Court on September 21, 2005, and thereafter, the Court issued its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
The Husband acknowledges on page 14 of his brief, that the Court may look at oral 
findings made by a Trial Court. This Court in the case of Hanson v. Hanson 736 p.2 
1055, 1058 (Utah 1987) stated that Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
specifically authorizes the Appellate Court to look beyond the written findings of fact to 
the trial record and evaluate the sufficiency of the Judge's oral findings. Rule 52(a) states 
in part, " . . . Findings of Fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the Trial Court to judge the creditably of the witnesses . . . It will be sufficient if the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated orally and recorded in open Court 
following the close of evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed 
by the Court. " (Rule 52(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Husband's Addendum Sec. 6) 
The Court's Findings as supplemented by its findings made orally in Court on 
September 21, 2005 supports the Court's conclusions and Decree. Those findings are 
sufficient to afford the Husband a meanful appeal contrary to the assertions of the 
Husband. 
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II 
The Husband's failed to marshal the evidence supporting the Trial Court's Findings. 
This Court has held on a number of occasions that an Appellant has the duty to 
marshal the evidence when challenging the Trial Court's Finding of Fact. This Court in 
the case of Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1999), stated the duty of an 
appellant to marshal evidence when challenging a Trial Court's Findings of Fact. When 
the Appellant fails to meet the heavy burden of marshaling the evidence the Court 
assumes that the records support the findings of the Trial Court and will affirm the Trial 
Court's findings. See Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure. 
Throughout his brief the Husband alleges that the Court did not make sufficient 
finding of fact and that the findings of fact were not support by evidence produced during 
the course of the trial. The Husband acknowledges his obligation to marshal the evidence 
under paragraph III of his Summary of Arguments on page 14, but the Husband does not 
make any attempt to present the evidence introduced at trial that supports the findings of 
the Court. The Husband also fails to correctly state to this Court the findings made by the 
Trial Court in its findings of fact made orally in court during the September 21, 2005 
hearing. 
Since the Husband has failed to marshal the evidence this Court should deny the 
Husband's appeal and confirm the Trial Court's ruling as to the issues addressed in the 
Husband's appeal and brief. 
Ill 
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The Trial Court's Findings Justified the Awarding of Attorney's Fees to the Wife 
The Husband claims there was no evidence received by the Court concerning the 
attorney fees requested by the Wife and no finding as to the necessary of the number of 
hours required, the reasonableness of the rate charged, and the rates commonly charged 
for a divorce action in the community. The Husband is incorrect in this assertion. 
The Wife testified that the attorney's fees listed under Exhibit R-15 were incurred by 
her for the divorce proceeding. The Wife testified that she paid a retainer and agreed to 
pay $200.00 per hour for her attorney's time, and $62.50 per hour for her attorney's staff 
time. (Tr. 1035:6-1036:2). The Wife's attorney, Robert A. Echard proffered testimony 
concerning his attorney's fees, and offered Exhibit R-15 which itemized the work, time, 
and charges incurred. Robert A. Echard, proffered that he charges $200.00 per hour; had 
been practicing law for 30 plus years; was qualified to practice law in this area; that 
$200.00 per hour was a reasonable fee for the services rendered in the case; and that the 
time shown in Exhibit R-15 was reasonable time, and expenses for the work he was 
required to perform in this case. (Tr. 1279:17-1280:18). The Husband's attorney, Philip 
Patterson agreed to the proffer. At the end of the proffer, Robert A. Echard offered to 
answer any questions by the Husband's attorney, Philip Patterson. Mr. Patterson did not 
want to ask any questions, and did not object to the Wife's Exhibit R-15. The Court 
accepted the proffer and Exhibit R-15. (Tr. 1279:5 - 1280:24). 
The Husband's attorney, Philip Patterson also proffered evidence as to the 
Husband's attorney's fees and offered Exhibit P-40 outlining those attorney's fees. That 
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proffer was agreed to by the Wife's attorney, and no objections were made to Exhibit P-
40. (Tr. 1323:3 - 1323:22). The attorney for the Husband during his proffer, proffered 
that the time spent on the case was reasonable as was the fee, and that the fees and costs 
incurred by the Husband was $33,279.27 (F. of Fctf 105) The Wife's attorney's fees 
plus costs amounted to $35,979.00 (F. of Fct.^ j 107). The attorney's fees and costs 
incurred by both parties were substantially the same even though the Wife's attorney was 
charging $200.00 per hour, and the Husband's attorney was charging $175.00 per hour. 
Both attorneys agreed to the proffers and proffered that the attorney's fees were 
reasonable and necessary. Both counsels had the opportunity to cross examine the other 
attorney as to the attorney's fees, but declined to do so. Both attorneys agreed that the 
Exhibits could be accepted by the Court. The Husband's complaint that there was no 
Affidavit or testimony given to support the Wife's attorney's fees is without merit. Both 
attorneys agreement to accept the testimony by proffer eliminated the necessity of having 
sworn testimony. The Exhibits concerning attorney's fees were accepted by the Court 
without an objection from either party and therefore, constitutes evidence the Court can 
rely upon in awarding attorney's fees. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 
1985) ruled in a divorce decree that a proffer of attorney fees by the wife's attorney that 
was stipulated to by the husband's attorney who did not cross examine the wife's attorney 
as to the reasonableness of the fee and offered no other evidence on the matter, was 
sufficient to justify the Court's award of attorney's fees. This Court ruled in the case of 
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Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 742 (Utah App. 1992) that an attorney in a divorce action 
could proffer testimony regarding the amount and reasonableness of attorney's fees where 
the opposing party did not object. A similar ruling was made in the case of 
Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 119 (Utah 1998). This Court in an 
unpublished opinion in the case of Three Fountains Owners Association v. Shar Leigh, 
1998 WL 1758332 (Utah App.) ruled that a proffer of attorney's fees was sufficient 
evidence to support a Trial Court's award of attorney's fees. 
The Husband claims the Court made an error of law in not making specific findings 
as it relates to the awarding of attorney's fees. It is the position on the Wife, that the 
Court did make findings and justified its awarded of attorney's fees to the Wife. 
Section 30-3-3(1) of the Utah Code Annotated authorizes the Court to award 
attorney's fees, costs, witness, and expert witness fees in order to enable the other party to 
prosecute and/or defend an action. Subparagraph (2) states in part, " . . . the Court may 
award costs and attorney's fees upon determining that the parties substantially prevailed 
upon the claim or defenses. " (Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3(2)) 
The Court found the Wife was employed and earned $4,000.00 per month (F. of 
Fct t 60) and that the Wife's monthly expenses amounted $7,125.00 (F. of Fct.| 62). 
These findings resulted in the Wife needing an additional $3,125.00 per month to meet 
her monthly expenses. The Court found the Husband earned $10,000.00 per month (F. of 
Fctf 63) with expenses of $7,311.53 per month (F. of Fct.f 65). Consequently, the 
Husband had $2,689.00 more per month than needed. These findings clearly 
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demonstrated that the Wife had a financial need, and that the Husband had the ability to 
pay. 
Judge Jones in his ruling of September 21, 2005 stated that he found that the Wife 
made less than the Husband, with the Husband making around $10,000.00 per month and 
the Wife making around $4,000.00 per month. The Court stated " . . . it seems to me that 
she clearly, from this case has the need for attorney's fees and he had the ability to pay. 
I'm also finding -1 think that the attorney's fees were reasonable . . . " (September 21, 
2005 Tr. 56:19 - 57:8, Wife's Addendum Sec. 8). 
Paragraphs 60 and 61 of the Court's Findings of Fact could cause confusion as to the 
Wife's income. The Court was correct in concluding that the Wife's income was 
$4,000.00 per month. It was incorrect in concluding that the Wife earned the annual 
income as set forth in paragraph 61 of the Findings. Paragraph 61 of the Memorandum 
Decision (Husband's Addendum Sec. 1) specifically references Exhibit P-4. The incomes 
listed were taken directly from the first page of that Exhibit. The first page of Exhibit P-4 
is not income earned by the Wife, but the Husband's cash flow between the years 1999 
and 2004, as indicated on the hearing of that document. Judge Jones in his decision of 
September 21, 2005 clarified this finding by stating that he took this information from 
Exhibit P-l which talks about the Wife's cash flow income. (September 21, 2005 Tr. 
48:17-48:19). 
Page one of Exhibit P-4 shows the Wife's cash flow between the years 1999 and 
2004. (Wife's Addendum Sec. 2). It is clear the Court took the incomes from 1999 
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through 2003 directly from this Exhibit. An examination of the Exhibit however, 
demonstrates that in 1999, $11,763.00 of the cash flow was from proceeds from a 
construction loan, $14,821.00 was from online gambling winnings, and $10,232.00 was 
from the sale of the property on 12th street. Consequently, $36,816.00 was not earned 
income. There are other entries that also demonstrate that the cash flow chart does not 
demonstrate an income, but the amount of monies that were available in a given year. 
The same is true for each year listed on the cash flow chart. The only wages for the Wife 
listed on the cash flow chart are: 
2001 - $6,662.00 
2002 - $17,320.00 
2003 - $16,043.00 
2004. - $10,839.00 
The Wife testified that the monies received from Bret Hunter or Hunting Energy and 
Consulting Inc. listed for 2004 were used to pay the business expenses associated with 
that company, and the Wife received $4,000.00 per month from her employment with that 
company (Tr. 1225:19 - 1227:22). Consequently, the Court's conclusion that the Wife 
received $4,000.00 per month net is accurate, in that the $4,000.00 was net after the 
business expenses. The Court's statement as to the Wife's net income of $4,000.00 per 
month is better understood when looking at Wife's Exhibit R-2 which was relied upon by 
the Court, and cited in its Memorandum Decision. Page 14, of Exhibit R-2, (Wife's 
Addendum Sec. 3) states that the wife's work with Hunter Energy and Consulting Inc., "... 
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will net her $4,000.00 per month for the next five with the possibility of the agreement 
going up to ten years...." The Wife's income of $4,000.00 is net after business expenses 
and not net after taxes. 
The Husband claims in his Memorandum that the only reason the Court gives for 
making an award of attorney fees was because the Husband was intransigent in requesting 
that the Wife receive none of the property. The Court found that the Husband had 
testified during the course of the trial that the Wife was not entitled to anything; that the 
Husband should be awarded everything, and that his position was unreasonable, 
untenable, and totally unrealistic. (F. of Fct.^ f 109 & 110) This finding resulted from the 
Husband's testimony as follows: 
Page Line 
621 16 Q - Mr. Stonehocker, let me just see if I understand. 
17 You want everything. 
18 A-that's correct. 
19 Q - She's to get nothing. 
20 A-That's correct. 
21 Q - And that's the reason we've been here trying this 
22 case as long as we have because your attitude from day one is 
23 you get everything, she gets nothing. 
24 A - If you want to phrase it that way, I guess so. 
(Vol IV Tr. 621:16-24) 
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The Court did not accept the Husband's position, and awarded the Wife a significant 
amount of the assets that were acquired during the course the marriage. The finding of 
the Court could and should be interpreted as that Court's rejection of the Husband's 
position and a ruling that the Wife prevailed in that regard. As cited above, Section 30-3-
3(2) of the Utah Code Annotated permits the Court to awarded attorney's fees to a party 
who has substantially prevailed upon a claim or a defense. 
The Trial Court entered the appropriate findings to meet the requirements of showing 
the need of the Wife, the ability to pay in the Husband; the reasonableness of the fees; and 
the fact the Wife had substantially prevailed on part of her claim. Consequently, the 
Court awarding of attorney's fees should be sustained. 
IV 
The Trial Court did not error in Ruling on the Husband's $46,000.00 premarital 
interest in the home and the $45,000 line of credit placed on the home by the 
Husband and used in the business. 
The Court found the Husband had provided the lot on which the West Haven home 
was built and that the premarital monies invested by the Husband in obtaining the lot 
amounted to $46,000.00. Sixteen thousand ($16,000.00) of that sum was a personal check 
from the Husband dated January 8, 1999, and $30,000 was from a line of credit on a Roy 
home which was the Husband's premarital asset (F. of Fct.^ j 36). The Court also found 
that on November 27, 2000, the Husband acquired $45,000.00 by placing a line of credit 
on the West Haven home and transferred that money into Stoney Motors in May 2001, 
and that the line of credit is an indebtedness of Stoney Motors (F. of Fct.^ j 25). 
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The approximate $46,000.00 had been invested into the West Haven home by the 
Husband purchasing a lot. On November 27, 2000 the Husband took $45,000.00 from a 
line of credit on the home and transferred that money into the Stoney Motors business. 
That debt is still listed on the Stoney Motors tax returns as a business debt. (Trial Exhibit 
P-3, Wife's Addendum Sec. 4 pg. 7, Vol. 11 Tr. 1251:20 - 1252:16) The Court required 
the Wife to assume and pay the line of credit of $45,000.00. The Court found that the 
Wife should assume and pay the line of credit which would be a full satisfaction of the 
Husband's premarital investment in the home of approximately $46,000.00 (F. of Fct.^ j 
42). This results in the Husband receiving $45,000.00 to his business without having to 
repay that loan, thus transferring his premarital assets of approximately $46,000.00 into 
the business. 
The Husband's claim in his Brief that the Court did not make any findings in 
relationship to the $46,000.00, is incorrect and the Husband's contention that the Court's 
findings were not supported by testimony during the course of the trial is also incorrect. 
The Husband testified that he borrowed $45,000.00 from line of credit in his name on 
November 27, 2000 (Vol III Tr. 396:13 - 396:22). The Wife testified that the Husband 
withdrew $10,000.00 from the line of credit on May 14, 2001, and $35,000.00 on May 15, 
2001 and placed those monies into his business checking account. (Vol IV 734:2 -
734:13) The Wife's Trial Exhibit 19 page 59, is a customer history from Zions, and shows 
that a draw was made on the line of credit on May 14, 2001 for $10,000.00, and May 15, 
2001 for $35,000.00 for a total of $45,000.00. (Wife's Addendum Sec. 5) The Wife 
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testified that the Husband told her that he wanted the line of credit on the home so that it 
would be available in the business to allow him to purchase automobiles with the 
$45,000.00 so that he could hold the vehicles until he could sell them without having to 
use money from the business. (Vol IV Tr. 735:17 - 736:5) The Husband testified that his 
2004 business tax return listed the $45,000.00 which was by that time amounted to 
$44,713.00 as a business loan. (Vol VIII Tr. 1386:1-1386:23, Wife's Addendum Sec. 4 p. 
7) 
It is clear that the Court's determination that the $45,000.00 obtained from the line of 
credit was used in the business and listed as a business debt is support by evidence at the 
trial, contrary to the allegations of the Husband in his brief. 
The Wife filed a Motion for Clarification and Modification of Order on the 10th day 
of August 2005 and a Memorandum in support of that Motion. The Wife asked the Court 
to readdress its ruling concerning the Husband's premarital interest in the home and the 
$45,000.00 indebtedness. On September 21, 2005, the Court ruled that it was changing its 
previous ruling and that the Husband was responsible for the $45,000.00 line of credit that 
was used in his business. (September 21, 2005 Tr. 28:17 - 28:19, 29:2 - 29:5) The Court 
discussed with the parties counsel the simplest way to adjust the Husband's premarital 
interest in the home of $46,000.00 and his obligation to pay the line of credit debt 
obligation of $45,000.00. The Court concluded that the Wife should pay the $45,000.00 
line of credit and that she would then not be required to pay the Husband for his 
premarital investment in the home. (September 21, 2005 Tr. 31:5 - 32:4, F. of Fctf 42) 
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The Husband's assertion in his brief that the Court decision concerning the 
Husband's premarital investment and the $45,000.00 received from line of credit should 
be reversed because there was no findings or evidence to justify the offset is inaccurate. 
The Husband's argument in his brief that the Court's decision was based upon a proffer of 
the 2004 tax return is incorrect. The Husband's argument in his brief that no findings 
were made by the Trial Court as to whether or not the line of credit was really an 
obligation of Stoney Motors is incorrect. The Court's decision is based upon evidence 
and findings of facts and should be sustained. 
V 
The Trial Court Did not commit error and did address the equity in the West 
Haven, Utah Home 
The Court found that the home was appraised for $455,000.00 with a first mortgage 
against it in the sum of $328,765.00 and an equity line credit balance of $44,990.00. (F. of 
Fctf 33, 34, and 35) This resulted in an equity in the home of $81,245.00. The Court also 
ruled that there was $46,000.00 of pre-marital monies that had been invested in the home 
by the Husband. However, the Court found that the $44,990.00 line of credit was a 
business loan and therefore, had to be paid for by the business. Therefore, the Husband's 
$46,000.00 premarital investment in the home was offset by the business debt which was 
an obligation against home. (F. of Fct.^ f 42) 
During the course of the trial, the Court received testimony from Carl Manzel, the 
father of the Wife. Carl Manzel was a licensed contractor. Mr. Manzel testified that he 
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built the home for his daughter without being compensated for his services as part of her 
inheritance. He had done the same for his other three children. (Vol VI Tr. 1138:19-
1140:7) Mr. Manzel testified that the services he rendered on the home as the general 
contractor for which he had not been paid was worth $90,000.00 and that he had 
performed additional labor for which he had not been compensated amounting to 
approximately $50,000.00 to $60,000.00. (Vol VI Tr. 1141:10 - 1142:23) 
The Wife testified that her father, Carl Manzel had built the West Haven home for 
her as part of her inheritance and that the difference between the market value of the home 
less the mortgages was her inheritance from her father. (Vol V Tr. 900:20 - 901:10, 
1242:8 - 1242:23) 
The Trial Judge specifically addressed this issue in his decision resulting from the 
proceedings held on September 21, 2005. In this regard the Court stated, "Now the next 
question that I had down had to do with home in West Haven. My original order was, of 
course, that we would award the home to her, but it was my intention that she be 
responsible for both mortgages, both the first and second mortgages, and I know Mr. 
Echard you mentioned something about that and I had not considered the labor that was 
put into the home by her father which is estimated about $90,000.00. I can tell you that is 
one of the reasons I gave her the home was because her father had put $90,000.00 worth 
of labor into it. I though I had considered that gift in awarding the home to her so. So I 
don't know if you want to talk about this thing about the second mortgage." (September 
21, 2005 Tr. 10:22 - 11:8, Wife's Addendum Sec. 9) 
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The Husband in his brief asserts that the equity in the home is $81,345.00, that the 
Wife testified that she should receive the home because of her father's assistance on the 
home, but that no findings were entered by the Trial Court as to validity of the claimed 
gift. The Husband claims the records is completely devoid of any findings written or oral 
concerning the gift. The Husband is wrong in stating that the Court made no findings 
concerning the gift. As cited in the preceding paragraph, the Court specifically made a 
finding as a result of the September 21, 2005 hearing that the Wife should be awarded the 
home because her father put $90,000.00 of labor into the home which was a gift to his 
daughter. The Husband had not claimed that the Court findings were clearly erroneous but 
merely that the Court had not made finding concerning its decision to award the 
approximately $81,000.00 worth of equity in the home to the Wife. The Husband's 
conclusion that the Court did not make the appropriate findings is incorrect. The Court 
found the value of the home; the amount of the equity; and that the home should be 
awarded to the Wife because the $90,000.00 gift of the father to the Wife gift exceeded 
the home equity. 
VI 
The Trial Court's awarding the 1998 Volkswagen Passat to the Wife was supported 
by the Findings and the evidence and was within the discretion of the Trial Court 
The Commissioner in an Order to Show Cause hearing held on the 10th day of 
September 2003, which was signed on the 8th day of October 2003, awarded the Wife the 
possession of the 1998 Volkswagen Passat automobile and awarded the Husband the 
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temporary possession of the vehicle that he was then using (Wife's Addendum Sec. 6). 
The Volkswagen Passat had been in the possession of the Wife since the Husband 
and Wife had separated in July 2003 (Vol I Tr. 382:12 - 382:25). The Husband testified 
that he wanted the titled to the Volkswagen Passat delivered to him and not to Stoney 
Motors. The Husband stated, "I want the repairs done to the Volkswagen Passat. I want 
clear title delivered to me and the car and I want the title to the Kei Sophia, a clear and 
unencumbered titled that I can put, signed off, I can put in the name of Stoney Motors." 
(Vol I Tr 619:1 - 619:11). The Husband's attorney, Philip Patterson in his closing 
argument acknowledged the Volkswagen Passat was part of the marital estate. In this 
regard, Mr. Patterson stated " . . . the Volkswagen Passat, as martial estate. Now I can 
understand, Mr. Stonehocker - it's like the condominium share, the Cabo San Lucas thing. 
I mean, it half, 50/50. You understand that, I understand that, Bob understands that. I 
mean its just a matter of math and what we are saying, that Volkswagen Passat and the 
Kei belong in the marital estate. They are just there." (Vol VIII Tr. 1492:16 - 1492:22). 
The Court in its September 21, 2005 ruling stated that it gave the Wife the car and 
the Husband the timeshare. (September 21, 2005 Tr. 47:6 - 47:8). 
The Court found that all of the personal property acquired during the course of the 
marriage was to be divided equally and that there was no exceptional circumstance 
justifying an unequal division of personal marital property (F. Fct. P Tf 82 & 83). The 
Court also found that all property owned or purchased during the marriage will be divided 
equally (F. Fct. P f 87). The Court awarded the Wife the Volkswagen Passat (F. Fct. P ^ 
30 
99) and awarded the Husband the Cabo San Lucas timeshare (F. Fct. P j^ 30). The Court 
also prepared a formula by which the parties could divide the remaining personal property 
(F. Fct. P f 88 - 90). 
The Husband's statement that the Volkswagen Passat should be delivered to him and 
his attorney's acknowledgment that the vehicle was a martial asset supports the Court 
findings that the vehicle and the timeshare were assets that should be divided between the 
parties. The Husband has not established that the Court acted inappropriately in dividing 
the personal property, including the vehicle. 
VII 
The Trial Court was not required to address the Issue of Rent Received by the Wife 
The Husband under point II D of his brief, claims the Court should have addressed 
rents the Wife received in the amount of $500.00 per month for approximately one year 
during the time that the divorce was pending. The Commissioner in an order resulting 
from a hearing on the 10th day of September 2003, and signed by the Court on October 8, 
2003, required the Husband to pay the first and second mortgages on the home in lieu of 
alimony. (Wife's Addendum Sec. 6) A Pre-Trial hearing was held before the 
Commissioner on April 29, 2004. (Wife's Addendum Sec. 1) 
The Pre-Trial order does not certify the issue of the rents which were received by the 
Wife. The Pre-Trial Order certifies the issues of alimony; the amount; and the duration; 
and the responsibility for various debts and obligations. (Wife's Addendum Sec. 1, ^ f 2(d) 
and (g)). If the Husband wanted the rent issue to be preserved for trial then the Husband 
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should have had the Court certify the issue at the Pre-Trial hearing. The Court's attention 
is drawn to the fact, that the Husband's then attorney, Martin W. Custen prepared the Pre-
Trial Order. 
It could be argued that the rent issue was preserved under the issue of alimony. If 
that is the case, the Court made a specific ruling as to alimony, and refused to grant any 
alimony to the Wife even though the Husband had an income of $10,000.00 per month, 
and the Wife had an income of $4,000.00 per month. Counsel for the Husband did not 
raise the rent issue in his closing argument. (Vol VIII Tr. 1403 - 1435, 1478 - 1484). 
Judge Jones in his September 21, 2005 ruling discussed the rent issue. The Court stated, 
"The last thing that you put down here is this imputed rental income. I know there was 
testimony about it. I don't remember anybody ever arguing about he was entitled to some 
kinda offset on imputed income." (September 21, 2005 Tr. 63:24 - 64:2) In relationship to 
the alimony, the Court stated that there was no way that the two people could live in 
separate household for the amount of money they used to live together. (September 21, 
2005 Tr. 66:14-66:21) 
The rent issue was not certified as an issue in the Pre-Trial Order and the Husband 
did not raise that issue during his closing arguments before the Judge. The Husband 
missed his opportunity to have that issue considered by the Court and should not be able 
to raise the issue at this time on Appeal. 
VIII 
The Trial Court did not fail to set a termination date regarding the Husband's 
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obligation to pay the First Mortgage and Line of Credit. 
The Husband was required to pay the first mortgage and line of credit on the home in 
lieu of alimony as a result of a ruling by the Commissioner on the 10th day of September 
2003 which order was signed on 8th day of October 2003. (Wife's Addendum Sec. 6) 
That order remained in place until such time as the final order was issued by the District 
Court Judge as a result of the divorce trial. Judge Jones issued a Memorandum Decision 
on the 5th day of July 2005. (Husband's Addendum Sec. 1) The Husband filed a request 
with the Court to review and reconsider part of its decision. The Wife filed a Motion for 
Clarification and Modification of Order. An Oral Argument was held on both Motions on 
September 21, 2005, resulting in modifications to the Court's Memorandum Decision. 
(September 21, 2005, Tr. 1:4 - 1:7) The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce were to be prepared by the Husband's attorney, Philip Patterson, but 
were ultimately prepared by the Wife's attorney, Robert A. Echard. The Decree of 
Divorce was not signed until the 28th day of December 2005 and entered with the Clerk of 
the Court on 3rd day of January 2006. 
The Order of the Commissioner remained in force until such time as the District 
Court Judge had made a final ruling in the divorce proceeding. Consequently, it was the 
Husband's obligation to pay the first and line of credit through the year 2005. The 
Husband requested at the hearing held on September 21, 2005, that his obligation to pay 
the first and second mortgages be terminated. However, Judge Jones stated that his 
obligation would continue in force until such time as the final decree of the divorce was 
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signed and filed with the Clerk of the Court. Judge Jones stated that the Memorandum 
Decision was not a final decree and therefore, the temporary order continued in place until 
such time as there was a final decree. (September 21, 2005, Tr. 65:8 & 19, 66:14 - 66:21) 
The Husband asserts that the Court's ruling is not just and fair and that the Court 
failed to address this issue. The Husband requested this Court to require the Trial Court 
to enter a cutoff date that is consist with the Memorandum Decision. It is clear the Trial 
Court considered and ruled on this issue at the September 21, 2005 hearing. The Husband 
has not given this Court any reason why this Court should substitute its opinion for that of 
the Trial Court Judge. In addition, the Husband has not cited any law to support his 
position that the Commissioner's order should be modified prior to the entry of the Trail 
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
A Temporary Order in a divorce proceeding that established alimony as payment of 
family support is not subject to being retroactively changed by a trial Judge. Whitehead v. 
Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1992) 
IX 
The Trial Court erred in failing to award Wife an Interest in the Business Stoney 
Motors 
The Court made a number of Findings of Fact that were relevant to the Stoney 
Motors business. (Husband's Addendum Sec. 2) Those are as follows: 
7. The Petitioner owns a used car dealership called "Stoney Motors." 
8. The Petitioner created the dealership in 2001. 
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9. The Respondent claims an interest in the dealership as a marital asset. 
10. The Respondent is listed on the LLC as a 50% owner of Stoney Motors. 
11. The Respondent is not involved in the day-to-day operation of the business. 
12. The Respondent did do some billing, and paperwork with the dealership 
several years ago. 
13. The Petitioner claims the dealership has no value for good will, and 
therefore, the Respondent is not entitled to any monetary compensation 
from the dealership. 
14. The dealership has been valued by accountant Chuck Ulrich at about 
$200,000.00. 
15. Accountant, Altina Stott told Chuck Ulrich that she valued the business at 
about $100,000.00. 
16. The Respondent asked for one-half of the value of the business as a marital 
asset. 
17. If the Petitioner retired at the time of the divorce and his dealership was 
actually sold, and an amount was realized over and above the value of the 
tangible assets, the full amount should be viewed as marital property. 
18. In this case, the Petitioner has not retired and no actual sale took place. The 
Petitioner continues his business as of the day of trial. 
19. It would not be equitable to require the Petitioner to pay the Respondent 
part of the value ascribed to the good will, because the good will of a car 
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dealer is nothing more than his reputation for competency. 
20. Professional reputations can be valued, but unless the professional retires 
and his business is sold, his reputation should not be treated differently from 
a professional or an advanced degree, both simply enhance and earning 
ability of the holder. 
21. Although the Respondent is listed as a co-owner of said business, the 
Respondent had only token involvement in the business for a limited period 
of time. 
23. The court finds that the business is in reality a sole proprietorship for the 
Petitioner, Rick Stonehocker. 
24. The court finds that the Respondent is not entitled to receive any portion of 
Stoney Motors as a marital asset. The court finds that the good will of 
Stoney Motors is solely attributable to the Petitioner's personal, 
professional reputation. The Respondent is not awarded anything for the 
good will of Stoney Motors. 
50. The court finds there is insufficient evidence to prove the Respondent hid 
income or diverted assets. 
51. The court will deny the Petitioner's claim for dissipation. 
80. An unequal division of marital personal property is only justified when the 
Court finds exceptional circumstances support distribution. 
83. The court finds no exceptional circumstances for an unequal division of 
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personal marital property. 
87. All property owned or purchased during the marriage will be divided 
equally. 
Paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 24 of the Findings of Fact are really conclusions that have 
been drawn by the Court from the Facts as set forth in the other paragraphs in the 
Findings that are quoted above. These conclusions are based upon the Trial Court's 
interpretation and application of law. The Court of Appeals gives deference to a Findings 
of Fact because the Trial Court judges the creditability of the witnesses. However, a 
Conclusion of Law is reviewed for correctness and given no special deference. See 
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1999). 
The Trial Court in paragraphs 80, 83, and 87 of its Findings,, finds that no 
exceptional circumstances existed that would justify an unequal division of personal 
marital property. In paragraph 87, the Court concluded that all property owned or 
purchased during the marriage will be divided equally. Paragraphs 80 and 83 are 
specifically directed towards personal property and paragraph 84 was probably also 
intended by the Court to relate to personal property. However, it is clear from these 
Findings that the Court found no basis to given an unequal distribution of property during 
the marriage. While these paragraphs talk about personal property, the Findings are 
equally applicable to the business. Consequently, the only basis for the Court not 
dividing the business is the Court's interpretation of the Law. The Court concluded that 
because the value of Stoney Motors consists primarily of good will it is not divisible. 
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The Husband filed a Memorandum with Authorities with the Court on 7th day of 
April 2005. The heading to the first point of that argument is as follows: "The Goodwill 
and Reputation Generated by the Petitioner Within Stoney Motors, LLC is not a Marital 
asset subject to Equitable Distribution." The Husband cites the case of Sorenson v. 
Sorenson, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992) for that proposition. It is obvious that the Trial 
Judge relied upon the Sorenson case in drawing its legal conclusions as set forth above. 
The Trial Court was incorrect in its interpretation and application of the Sorenson case 
and Utah Law. 
In Sorenson, the Utah Supreme Court, in a split decision, with Justice Zimmerman 
and Justice Durham dissenting, concluded that the Court of Appeals previously ruled that 
advanced educational degrees cannot be valued as an asset, and the private practice by a 
dentist who holds an advanced degree should be treated the same. The court found in 
cases of advanced educational degrees and professional licenses, such as doctors and 
dentists, the advanced degree and professional standing should be used in establishing the 
amount of alimony and child support to be paid, however, the court could not use those 
degrees to establish alimony and child support and, at the same time, place a value on the 
goodwill associated with those degrees or professional licenses. 
The court in Sorenson stated,".. .the combination of the degree and the Petitioner's 
reputation enables him or her to earn in many cases a substantial income, the fruits of 
which are shared by the children in the form of child support and by the former spouse in 
the form of alimony. That is true in the instant case where the Defendant has been 
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ordered to pay substantial amounts of child support and alimony which were determined 
in light of his earnings from his dental practice. .. .[T]o consider future earning capacity in 
the valuation of the professional corporation's goodwill would have the effect of double 
counting, as earning capacity as also used in determining the appropriate alimony award." 
Id. at 776. 
The opinion in the Sorenson case clearly demonstrates the Supreme Court felt that 
where there was an advanced educational degree or professional solo practice, the court 
had to take into consideration the value of the business and/or the income produced from 
the business. This could be addressed by awarding substantial alimony to the partner or 
could be awarded by valuing the business, however, it was not appropriate to do both. 
The Court in Sorenson found that is was not appropriate for the Trial Court to divide the 
business which was producing the income while at the same time requiring Dr. Sorenson, 
a dentist, to pay substantial amounts in alimony and child support. That circumstance 
does not exist in this case. The Court did not awarded the Wife alimony and the parties 
do not have any children. It should also be noted that the evaluation of Stoney Motors 
LLC, performed by the Wife's accountant, Chuck Alridge specifically reserved to the 
Husband a salary of $78,000.00 per year in calculating the value of the business. (Trial 
Exhibit R-17, pg. 1, Wife's Addendum Sec. 7) The Trial Court has awarded to the 
Husband a business valued at $200,000.00 in addition to the $78,000.00 annual income. 
That certainly was not the intent of the court in the Sorenson case. 
Utah Courts are required to divide property that is part of the marital estate 50% to 
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each party, except in unusual circumstances. The Utah Appellate Court, in the case of 
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990), found that the trial court should 
categorize the parties property as being part of the marital estate or as separate property of 
one of the parties. It is then presumed that each party is entitled to receive 50%o of the 
marital property. The court, in footnote 4 of its decision, stated that the court could 
approve an unequal distribution where a significant compensating factor could justify 
such a split. A similar ruling was made in the case of Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 
887 (Utah App. 1999). In Bradford, the Court stated that an unequal distribution of the 
marital property was only justified under exceptional circumstances supporting the 
distribution. 
The Trial Court recognized the requirement of Utah Law that a marital estate be 
divided 50% to each party except in unusual circumstances. (F. of Fct.f 80, 83 & 87) As 
evidenced by its Findings in paragraphs 7-10, and 24 the Trial Court clearly recognized 
that Stoney Motors, LLC was created during the marriage and was a marital asset. The 
Wife asserts that there is no legal basis for the Court to conclude that because a business 
consists of good will its value is not divisible in a divorce proceeding. The parties were 
married on April 25, 1998 and the business was created in 2001 as a Limited Liability 
Company with each party being a 50% owner. The good will of the business could only 
have been created from the dates of its creation in 2001 to the date of the trial. The 
Husband was not the only person operating the business. The Husband testified that 
Randy Guerrio was a contract worker for the company who sold cars. (Vol VIII Tr. 
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1363:1-1363:4) 
The Wife asserts that Stoney Motors is a marital asset and its market value should be 
divided between the parties equally. The Court's conclusion otherwise was based upon 
an inaccurate reading and application of Utah Law. 
X 
The Trial Court erred in failing to require the Husband to pay one-half (Vi) of the 
$52,000.00 loan owed to Carl Manzel 
The following Findings of Fact (Husband's Addendum Sec 2) are relevant as the 
division of the $52,000.00 loan from the Wife's father, Carl Manzel. 
49. While marital assets are generally valued as of the date of the divorce, 
where one party has dissipated an asset, or hidden its value, the Court may 
in the exercise of equitable power, value assets at some time other than the 
decree. 
50. The court finds there is insufficient evidence to prove the Respondent hid 
income or diverted assets. 
51. The court will deny the Petitioner's claim for dissipation. 
72. Any debts incurred after separation which was July 31, 2003, are the 
responsibility of the parties who took out the debt or loan. 
73. Any debts incurred during the marriage and before separation will be 
divided equally, regardless of who took out the debt or loan. 
74. The court finds that the Petitioner knew about the debts that were incurred 
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during the marriage. 
75. Although the parties separated three times during the marriage, they 
reconciled each time, with the exception of the last separation. 
76. The court finds that the Petitioner forgave the Respondent for any debts 
incurred during the first and second separation, and thus those debts 
become marital debts to be divided equally. 
77. However, the Respondent is solely responsible for paying off the 
$52,000.00 loan from her father Carl Manzel. 
78. Respondent is solely responsible for the $26,000.00 loan from Todd 
Walker. 
80. An unequal division of marital personal property is only justified when the 
Court finds exceptional circumstances support distribution. 
83. The court finds no exceptional circumstances for an unequal division of 
personal marital property. 
The Debt to Todd Walker which is set forth in section 78 of the Findings of Fact is a 
debt that was incurred by the Wife after the parties separation and therefore, is a debt that 
the Wife is obligated to pay. (Vol VI Tr. 1222:13 - 1222:17) However, the debt of 
$52,000.00 to Carl Manzel set forth in section 77 of the Findings of Fact, is a debt 
incurred by the parties during the marriage and prior to their separation in June 2003. The 
loan in the approximate sum of $52,000.00 was made in 2001 to pay off credit cards that 
the Husband and the Wife had. (Vol VI Tr. 1090:10 - 1092:22) 
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The Husband claimed during the trial that the Wife dissipated marital assets and 
acted inappropriately and therefore, the Court should not equally divide the parties debts 
and assets. The Court dealt with this issue in paragraphs 49 through 51 of its Findings. 
The Court found there was insufficient evidence to find that the Wife had hidden income 
or diverted the marital assets and therefore, denied the Husband's claim for dissipation. 
The Court also found that the Husband forgave the Wife for any indebtedness incurred 
during the first and second separation of the parties and that those debt became marital 
debt to be divided equally. Having rejected the Husband's claims that the debts should 
not be divided equally between the parties, the Court then without explanation concludes 
in paragraph 77 of the Finding of Fact that the Wife should be solely responsible for the 
$52,000.00 loan from her father. This conclusion is totally unsupported by the Findings 
which the Court made requiring that all debt incurred during the marriage be divided 
equally. The only way the Court could fail to divide the debts equally, is if it were offset 
by some other property distribution or if the Court found that the Wife was guilty of 
dissipation or other improper activities during the parties marriage that would justify 
placing the entire responsibility on the Wife. The Court found specifically that no such 
circumstance existed. 
The Wife assert that the Court's conclusion that the Wife should pay the $52,000.00 
to her father is reviewed by this Court for its correctness and given no special deference 
on appeal. This Court should require the Husband to pay one-half QA) of the $52,000.00 
loan or that portion of the loan that was owing at the date of the parties separation. 
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XI 
The Wife should be awarded attorney's fees on Appeal. 
The Wife was awarded attorney's fees by the Trial Court. This Court held in the 
case of Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah App. 1992), that when a Trial Court 
awards fees in a domestic action the party who substantially prevails on an appeal should 
be awarded attorney's fees on appeal. The Wife contends that this is an appropriate case 
in which she should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs on appeal. The Wife 
requests that the matter be remanded to the Trial Court Judge to enter an order awarding 
the Wife reasonable attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Husband in his appeal claims there are not sufficient findings issued by the 
court to support the Court's decisions and that the court's findings did not support its 
decisions. The husband asks this Court to overturn the Court's awarding of attorneys fees 
to the Wife; failing to award the husband a premarital interest in the home; failing to 
award the Husband equity in the West Haven home; awarding the Wife the 1998 
Volkswagen Passat; not giving the Husband credit for rent paid on the home prior to the 
entry of the Divorce Decree and requiring the husband to continue to pay the first 
mortgage and line of credit until the Divorce became final. The Court made findings on 
each of the issues raised in the Husband's appeal. The findings were in the written 
findings and made in open Court. The Courts Findings are supported by evidence 
received by the Court during the trial. 
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The husband asked this Court to overturn the court's findings, but does not marshal 
the evidence to overturn those findings as required by the rules of appellate procedure and 
this Court's prior decisions. Since he has not complied with this court's rules the 
Husband's appeal should be dismissed. 
The Trial Court found the need of the wife, the ability of the Husband to pay and 
that the Wife's attorneys fees were reasonable. The Court also found that the husband had 
unduly prolonged the trial and that the wife should be awarded attorney's fees and costs. 
This award is supported by the Courts Findings of Fact, and the evidence received by the 
Court. 
The Court found that the husband's $46,000.00 premarital interest in the home had 
been satisfied by him removing $45,000.00 from the home and placing it in his business. 
The Court required the wife to pay and refinance the $45,000.00 which had been taken 
out of the line of credit, thereby relieving the husband and the business from paying that 
indebtedness. The Court found that this was the best way to satisfy the Husband's claim 
for his premarital interest in the home. The Courts findings are clear on this issue and are 
supported by the evidence. 
The Court found that the parties had equity in the home after the payment of the first 
mortgage and line of credit of $81,245.00. The Court found that the Wife's father, Carl 
Manzel, had built the home for his daughter and given to her as a gift or advancement on 
her inheritance $90,000.00 worth of value which exceeded the amount of the equity in the 
home. The evidence supports the Court's Findings. 
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The Court divided the personal property equally between the parties. The Wife was 
awarded the 1998 Volkswagen Passat and the Husband was awarded the Cabo San Lucas 
timeshare. The Court provided for the other personal property to be divided equally. The 
Court's findings were supported by the evidence. 
The Husband claims that he should have been given a credit for rent received by the 
Wife during the pendency of the divorce proceeding This issue was not certified as an 
issue in the pretrial order and was not argued during the course of the trial. The Court 
found that since it had not been raised to in the trial, the issue is not before the Court. 
The Court found that the temporary order requiring the husband to pay the first 
mortgage and the line of credit payments during the penance of the divorce proceeding 
would remain in force until the divorce decree was final. The Court's decision is 
supported by findings and is consistent with the evidence and State Law. 
The Wife appealed from the Courts failure to award her an interest in Stony Motors 
an automobile dealership created during the course the marriage. The Court found that 
the assets and debts acquired during the marriage should be divided equally and that there 
was no basis to treat them otherwise. However the Court then awarded the husband the 
full interest in the business valued at approximate $100-$200,000.00 because it was 
primarily good will. The Court stated that it did not have the authority to divide this asset 
with the wife and could not do so unless the husband had sold the business or had died. 
This finding is not consistent with state law and should be overturned by this Court. The 
Wife should be awarded one half of the interest in the business, which is a Limited 
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Liability Company which lists the wife as a 50% owner. The Wife is not asking this court 
to overturn the findings of the Court, but rather its conclusion. This court gives no special 
deference to the Trial Court's conclusion. 
The Court ruled that all of the debt acquired by the parties during the course of the 
marriage be equally divided between the parties. The Court then failed to divide a debt in 
the sum of $52,000.00 that was owed to the wife's father. This debt had been created 
during the marriage to pay off debts of both parties. The Court's findings that the debts 
were to be divided equally and that there was no basis to not require both parties to pay 
the debts equally were correct. However the Court's failure to require the Husband to 
pay one halve of this debt is not fair and consistent with the Court's Findings and should 
be reversed by this Court. The wife does not challenge the findings but rather the court's 
conclusion and therefore this Court should give no special deference to the Court trials 
conclusions. 
The Wife was awarded attorneys fees by the trial court. The Wife requests this court 
award her attorneys fees on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee/ 
Cross Appellant 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICK L. STONEHOCKER, 
Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
vs. 
JACQUELINE F.M. STONEHOCKER, 
Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
Appellate Court No. 20060292 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Robert A. Echard, certify that on January 2007,1 served two copies of the 
Brief of the Appellee/Cross Appellant upon Steven R. Bailey, counsel for the 
Petitioner/Appellant/Cross Appellee, Rick L. Stonehocker, by personally and delivering 
two copies of the Brief of the Appellee/Cross Appellant, to the following address: 2454 
Washington Boulevard, Ogden, UT 84401. 
DATED this day of January 2007. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
Cross Appellant 
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Tabl 
MARTIN W. CUSTEN
 r t T | t . . . ~ { : ^ 
Attorney for Petitioner av* •*"" " ' ^ 
1004 24th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 . . ' . '.., 
Telephone: (801)621-3662 
Facsimile: (801)392-2543 
Utah State Bar No. 0785 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
RICK L STONEHOCKER, : PRE-TRIAL ORDER 
Petitioner, : ^ 
vs. : 
JAQUELINE F.M. STONEHOCKER, Civil No. 024902009 
Respondent. : Judge: Ernie W. Jones 
- h^r 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing for Pre-trial on April 
29, 2004, before the Honorable Douglas Thomas, Domestic Relations Commissioner of 
the above-entitled court. Petitioner was personally present and represented by his 
attorney, Martin W. Custen. Respondent was personally present and represented by her 
attorney, Robert A. Echard. The court also has previously waived the requirement that the 
parties attend any further mediation in this matter. The court, having discussed matters 
with counsel and the parties, now makes and enters the following: 
PRE-TRIAL ORDER 
1. The Commissioner certifies this matter for trial. No requests for delay 
of trial shall be made, based upon incomplete discovery at the time of trial. Petitioner has 
agreed that he has or will deliver to respondent's business valuation expert, Charles Ulrich, 
all of the relevant 2003 and 2004 records through the last month preceding the date of trial 
of this matter. P^-I&M order 
VD11649365 
024902009 STONEHOCKER.JAQUELINE FM 
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker 
Civil No. 024902009 
Page 2 
2. The following are the issues to be addressed at trial: 
A. Business valuation of the parties' business. 
B. The value of any real property owned by the parties together 
or by either of them. 
C. The value of all personal property of the parties. 
D. Alimony, as to amount and duration, as well as to fault-related 
matters. 
E. Issues relating to the parties' 2002 federal and state tax returns. 
F. Responsibility for attorney's fees. 
G. Responsibility for the parties' various debts and obligations. 
H. Responsibility for the utility bills in connection with the marital 
residence, which bills were unpaid as of September 10, 2003. 
I. Issues relating to the various retirement accounts of the parties. 
J. Issues related to dissipation of the marital estate by either or 
both of the parties. 
3. Procedural matters: 
A. Petitioner anticipates calling three, or possibly four witnesses 
including himself. Respondent anticipates calling four to seven witnesses including herself. 
The parties anticipate that this trial will take three days, and the Commissioner certifies this 
for a three day trial, as the business valuation issues may take a full day or more just by 
themselves. 
p. 
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker 
Civil No. 024902009 
Page 3 
B. The parties are to exchange witness lists and exhibit lists no 
later than 10 days prior to trial, subject to the proviso that Judge Jones can alter the time 
period with respect to this requirement. 
DATED this 7C/ day of / " T ^ \ / , 2004. 
BY RECOMMENDATION: 
f 
BY THE COURT: 
ERNIE W. JONES 
District Judge 
Approved As To Form and Content 
bz-^P 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Respondent 
Tab 2 
CASH FLOWS 
1999-2004 
Jan - Dec 04 Jan - Dec 03 
Cash Income 
Alimony - Temporary 
Amer First CU Bank Stmt Deposits 
Ashley Manzel 
Beneficial Financial 
Bret Hunter 
Bryce Green 
Carls Acct #30665 Jacques Name 
Carole/Chad/Peggy 
Cash Deposit 
Chase Manhatten/Credit Cards 
Checks Written to Forest Manzel 
Construction Loan 
Deana Heywood 
Debbie Bishop 
Direct Merchant's Bank 
E-Trade Joint Acct 
Farmers/Prematic 
First USA Bank Credit Card 
Forest and/or Carl Manzel 
FSB - Joint 
Interest Income 
Jack Stonehocker 
Jeanne Woodfield 
Keith Olsen 
Keybank - Joint 
Loan from AFCU Overdraft 
Loan from GWCU 
Mary Ann Nessen 
Online Gamble - iGMPay 
Online Gamble - Proc Cyber Serv 
Online Gamble - Epoint 
Online Gamble - Firepay.com 
Qwest 
Rachael Stonehocker 
Regence Blue Cross - Rick 
Regence Value Care 
Robert Thomas 
Robin Velasquez 
Salary /Wages 
Sky west/Hartford 
Sale of 12th Street Home 
Sentinel Management Group 
Smith Barney - Joint Account 
Stonehocker, Rick 
Stoney Motors, LLC 
Todd Walker 
Unknown Sources 
US Bank Deposits per Bank Stmt 
Wells Fargo 
Zions Bank 
Zions Mortgage-Escrow Overpmt 
Total Cash Income 
651.00 
6.450.00 
34.500.00 
200.00 
192.00 
18.333.10 
71.37 
233.00 
195.00 
8.530.00 
4.997 67 
150.00 
100.00 
730.40 
2,312.69 
500 00 
10.839.92 
5.260.36 
440.00 
216.04 
16.043.59 
Jan - Dec 02 
11.793.99 
6,695.00 
17.320.44 
Jan - Dec 01 
750.00 
Jan - Dec 00 Jan - Dec 99 
140.00 
3.562.00 
217.00 
670.00 
631.00 
6.662.92 
4.560.00 
54.21 
17.159.96 
1.110.00 
46.00 
45.00 
34.00 
6,777.00 
1.55 
170.00 
4.435.00 
1.400.00 
11.68 
3.000.00 
22.110.93 
1.34 
1.54 
2.820 83 
40.00 
2.150.00 
250.00 
1.175.50 
63.00 
1.554.00 
240.00 
56.29 
125.80 
300.00 
100.00 
2.072.00 
1.700.00 
193.50 
4,700.00 
188.10 
3,300.00 
5.440.00 
11.763.68 
285.00 
1.000.00 
7,500.00 
1.036.00 
126.00 
14.821.00 
2.475.00 
300.00 
$ 88.922.39 
4 * 
$ 
838.19 
7.770.00 
26.000.00 
3.043.26 
14.008.48 
1.000.00 
108.589.18 $ 
17,514.00 
6,546.00 
66.307.30 $ 
11.650.00 
5.900.00 
750.94 
2.443.36 
35,416.31 $ 
1.200.00 
714.48 
4.423.00 
3.769.14 
52.446.39 $ 
10,232.88 
3.500.00 
5.000.00 
4.115.00 
64.819.56 
140,104.06 
Tab 3 
Bret P. Hunter 
[n jy t l l f e r ©©fflgyflUfiirai M©* President 
January 19, 2005 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Jaqueline Manzel Stonehocker has worked in assisting in the successful award of an 
agreement with JES, Inc. of Colorado that will net her $4,000.00 per month for the next 5 
years with the possibility of the agreement going out to 10 years. She will also be 
assisting in the development of other agreements that will bring her even more 
opportunity in the future. 
If you have any questions, feel free to contact me. 
Regards, 
Bret P, Hunter 
President 
Hunter Energy Consulting, Inc. 
359 East Main Street, Suite 3 • American Fork, Utah 84003 
Tab 4 
Form 1065 
Department of tT» Treasury 
internal Revenue Service 
U.S. Return of Partnership Income 
For calendar year 2004, or tax year beginning 
ending , 20 
• See separate instructions. 
,2004, and 
OMB No.1545-0099 
2004 
A Principal business activity 
SALES BROKERING 
0 Pnnapal product or service 
AUTOMOBILES 
C Business code number 
423100 
Use the 
IRS 
label. 
Other-
wise, 
print 
or type. 
STOHEY MOTORS, LLC 
2850 PENNSYLVANIA AVE SUITE 1 
OGDEN, OT 84401-3304 
87-0680281 
E Date business started 
8/01/2001 
F TaUt 
$ 
ets (see rtstrs) 
20,024. 
(3) I I Name change (4) |_j Address change (5) Q Amended return 
(3) Mother (specify) • 
G Check applicable boxes: (1) 
H Check accounting method: (1) 
Initial return 
Cash 
(2) Fnal return 
Accrual 
Number of Schedules K-1. Attach one for each person who was a partner at any time during the tax year. 
Caution: Include only trade or business income and expenses on lines la through 22 below. See the instructions for more information. 
I 
N 
C 
o 
N 
s 
T 
R 
81 
S» 
C s Js 
O R 
• 
I 
T 
A 
T 
I 
O 
1 a Gross receipts a sales 
b Less returns and allowances. 
l a 
l b 
1,449,745. 
Cost of goods sold (Schedule A, line 8) 
Gross profit. Subtract line 2 from line 1c 
Ordinary income (toss) from other partnerships, estates, and trusts 
(attach schedule) 
Net farm profit (loss) (attach Schedule F (Form 1040)) 
Net gain (loss) from Form 4797, Part II, line 17 
Olher income (loss) 
(attach statement) 
8 Total income Qoss> Combine lines 3 through 7 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16a Depreciation (if required, attach Form 4562) 
b Less depreciation reported on Schedule A and elsewhere on return. 
17 Depletion (Do not deduct oil and gas depletion.). 
18 Retirement plans, etc 
19 Employee benefit programs 
Salaries and wages (other than to partners) 
Guaranteed payments to partners 
Repairs and maintenance 
Bad debts 
Rent 
Taxes and licenses.. 
Interest 
16a 
16b 
20 Other deductions „ „ „ « w . , w m . « ^ « . „ (aftadistafemenf) SEE. STATEMENT. 1 
21 Total deductions. Add the amounts shown in the far right column for lines 9 through 20 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16c 
17 
18 
19 
21 
1,449,745. 
1,298,780. 
150,965. 
150,965. 
10,341. 
5,875. 
66,495. 
82,711. 
22 Ordinary business income (loss). Subtract line 21 from line 8 j 22 68,254. 
Sign 
Here 
Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of rrykncrwledge and 
belief, it is true, correct, and complete. Declaration of preparer (olher than general partner or limited liability company member) is based on ail information of 
which preparer has any knowledge. 
Signature of general partner or fimrted HabtOty company manager Date 
May the IRS discuss tfvs return 
wflh 1he preparer shown below 
"Ha*, n» (seeinstrs)? 
Paid 
Preparer's 
Use Only 
****** ALTIN& L . STOTT, CPA 
Date 
Check if self-
employed. . . 
Finn's name 
(orvoursrf ^ 
serf-empfcyed), ™ 
address, and 
ZIP code 
WIGGINS & CO., PC 
3434 WASHINGTON BLVD., STE 303 
OGDEN, OT 84401 
a 
Preparer* SSN or PTIN 
P00446101 
ON 87-0662950 
Phomno. (801) 627-2710 
BAA For Privacy Act and Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see separate instructions. PTPA0105L 01J06AB F o r m 1 0 6 5 (2004) 
Form 1065 G004) STOMEY MOTORS, LLC 8 7 - 0 6 8 0 2 8 1 Page 2 
I C o s t Of G o o d s S o l d (see instructions) 
Inventory at beginning of year 
Purchases less cost of items withdrawn for personal use. 
Cost of labor 
Additional section 263A costs 
(attach statement) 
Other costs 
(attach statement) SEE. STATEMENT. 2 
6 ToteL Add lines 1 through 5. 
7 Inventory at end of year 
8 Cost of goods sold. Subtract line 7 from line 6. Enter here and on page 1, line 2 
9a Check all methods used for valuing dosing inventory: 
(i) n Cost as described in Regulations section 1.471-3 
Lower of cost or market as described in Regulations section 1.471 -4 
Other (specify method used and attach explanation) * 
b Check this box if there was a writedown of 'subnormal' goods as described in Regulations section 1.471 -2(c) 
c Check this box if the UFO inventory method was adopted this tax year for any goods (W checked, attach Form 970). 
d Do the rules of section 263A (for property produced or acquired for resale) apply to the partnership? 
e Was there any change in determining quantities, cost, or valuations between opening and closing inventory? 
If 'Yes', attach explanation.. _ _ _ 
1 ! 
2 i 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
I 8 
1,270,827. 
27,953. 
1,298,780. 
1,298,780. 
•
Y
« p 
LjYes D 
No 
No 
Other Information 
1 What type of entity is filing this return? Check the applicable box: 
Domestic limited partnership 
Domestic limited liability partnership 
Other. . . . • 
« * * or m any foreign entity that 
^2 and 301.7701-3? If yes, see 
Domestic general partnership 
Domestic limited liability company 
Foreign partnership 
2 Are any partners in this partnership also partnerships?. 
3 During the partnership's tax year, did the partnership own any interest H 
was disregarded as an entity separate from its owner under fegutajjpnd 
instructions for required attachment ^ ^ . - 1 ^ 
4 Did the partnership file Form 8893, Election of PartnersHfc fevey"Jrffcatrnent, or an election statement under section 
6231(a)(1)(B)(iQ for partnership-level tax treatoMoWiat W A e j P c f r o r this tax year? See Form 8893 for more details... 
5 Does this partnership meet all three oUheto&J^wppr l r r ten ts? 
a The partnership's total receipts ^ p ^ w c w u p r e r e less than $250,000; 
b The partnership's total assets at l a ^ a f f t t i e tax year were less than $600,000; and 
c Schedules K-1 are filed with the return and furnished to the partners on or before the due date (including extensions) 
for the partnership return. 
If 'Yes,' the partnership is not required to complete Schedules L, M l , and M-2; Hem F on page 1 of Form 1065; or 
Item N on Schedule K-1 
mm. 
6 Does this partnership have any foreign partners? If *Yes/ the partnership may have to file Forms 8804,8805 and 8813. See instructions 
7 Is this partnership a publicly traded partnership as defined in section 469<k)(2)? 
8 Has this partnership hied, or is it required to file. Form 8264, Application for Registration of a Tax Shelter? 
9 At any time during calendar year 2004, did the partnership have an interest in or a signature or other authority over 
a financial account in a foreign country (such as a bank account, securities account, or other financial account)? 
See the instructions for exceptions and filing requirements for Form TD F 90-22.1. If 'Yes,' enter the name of 
the foreign country.. ^ 
10 During the tax year, did the partnership receive a distribution from, or was it the grantor of, or transferor to, a foreign trust? 
If 'Yes,' the partnership may have to file Form 3520. See instructions. 
11 Was there a distribution of property or a transfer (e.g., by sale or death) of a partnership interest during the tax year? 
If *Yes,' you may elect to adjust the basis of the partnership's assets under section 754 by attaching the statement 
described in the instructions under Sections Made By the Partnership. 
12 Enter the number of Forms 8865, Return of U.S. Persons With Respect to Certain Foreign Partnerships, attached 
to this return 
I f t l i 
mm 
P$M<4 
mmmm 
Designation of Tax Matters Partner (see instructions) 
Enter below the general partner designated as the tax matters partner (TMP) for the tax year of this return: 
Name of 
designated TMP • 
Address of ^ 
designated TMP ^ 
Identifying 
number of TMP • 
PTPA0112L 01A3S05 Form 1065 (2004) 
Form 1065 (2004) STOMEY MOTORS, LLC 8 7 - 0 6 8 0 2 8 1 
Partners" Distributive Share Hems 
(Loss) 
1 Ordinary business income (toss) (page 1, line 22) 
2 Net rental real estate income (loss) (attach Form 8825) 
3a Other gross rental income (toss) I 
b Expenses from other rental activities (attach stint) |_ 
c Other net rental income (toss). Subtract line 3b from line 3a 
4 Guaranteed payments 
5 Interest income 
6 Dividends: a Ordinary dividends. 
b Qualified dividends [ 
7 Royalties. 
8 Net short-term capital gain (loss) (attach Schedule D (Form 1065)).. 
9a Net long-term capital gain (toss) (attach Schedule D (Form 1065)) 
b Collectibles (28%) gain (toss) 
c Unrecaptured section ISO gain (attach statement) 
10 Net section 1231 gain (toss) (attach Form 4797) 
11 Other woome (toss) (attach sUJement) 
6b I 
9b I 
9c I 
Paqe3 
Total amount 
6a 
9a 
10 
11 
68,254. 
Deduc-
tions 
12 Section 179decfcjction (attachForm4562).... 
13a Contributions 
b Deductions related to portfolio income (attach statement). 
c Investment interest expense 
dSectiofi99(eX2) expenditures: (1) Type • 
e Other deductions (attach statement) 
12 
SEE. .STATEMENT. .3 13a 20. 
13b 
13c 
(2) Amount H 13d(2) 
13e 
Self-
Employ-
M a Net earnings (toss) from self-employment 
b Gross farming or fishing income 
c Gross nonfarm income 
14a 34,127. 
14b 
Credits 
fcCredrt 
Recap-
ture 
Foreign 
Trans-
actions 
16a Name of country or U.S. possession^ 
b Gross income from all 
c Gross income 
Foreign gross income &rfrfWpartnersNp level 
d Passive • e ti^ csteqMKs (attach statement) 
Deductions allocated and apportioned at partner level 
g Interest expense *• h Other 
Deductions allocatedand apportioned at partnership kyel to hxetgnsowxx'nxome 
I Passive * j Listed cakqpnes (attach statement) + 
I Foreign taxes: (1) Paid • (2) Accrued. 
m Reduction in taxes available for credit (attach statement). 
15a Low-income housing credit (section 42(j)(5)) 
b Low-income housing credit (other) 
c Qualified rehabilitation expenditures (rental real estate) (attach Fom\ 
d Other rental real estate credits 
e Other rental credits 
f Other credits and credit recapture (attach sUteitientX 
16c 
f General limitation 16ff 
16h 
kGeneral limitation. 16k 
™'(9 
16m 
Alternative] 
17a Post-1986 depreciation adjustment 
b Adjusted gain or toss 
c Depletion (other than oil and gas). 
d Oil, gas, and geothermal properties — gross income, 
e Oil, gas, and geothermal properties — deductions... 
f Other AMT items (attachstmt) 
17a 
17b 
17c 
17d 
17e 
171 
Other 
| - , f n • 
•nor-
mation 
18a Tax-exempt interest income 
b Other tax-exempt income 
c Nondeductible expenses 
19a Distributions of cash and marketable securities.. 
b Distributions of other property 
20a Investment income 
b Investment expenses 
c Other items and amounts (attach stmt) 
18a 
18b 
18c 5,543. 
19a 72,634. 
19b 
20a 
20b 
'Itii 
BAA Form 1065 (2004) 
PTPA0134L O1AJ5A05 
Form 1065 COW) STOHEY MOTORS, LLC 8 7 - 0 6 8 0 2 8 1 Page 4 
Analysis of Net Income (Loss! 
1 Net income (loss). Combine Schedule K, Hnes 1 through 1 1 . From the result, subtract the sum of 
Schedule K. lines 12 through 13e, 1610), and 161(2) 
2 Analysis by 
partner type: 
a General 
partners.... 
b United 
pjwtners.... 
0) Corporate 00 Individual 
(active) 
3 4 , 1 1 7 . 
(Hi) Individual 
(passive) 
3 4 , 1 1 7 . 
(iv) Partnership 
1 
(v) Exempt 
organization 
68,234. 
1 (vty Nominee/Other 
Note: Schedules L, M-1 and M-2 are not required if Question 5 of Schedule B is answered Y e s / 
• P I -IJU.IJ LUILHH.i l II' - I I -JI ILIUIU-JIUI T I I I i - I • i in .i in i -
I Balance Sheds per Books End of tax year 
Assets 
1 Cash 
2 a Trade notes and accounts receivable. . . 
b Less allowance for bad debts 
3 Inventories 
4 ULS. government obligations 
5 Tax-exempt securities 
6 Other current assets (attach stmt). 
7 Mortgage and real estate loans. 
8 Other investments (Mbcfts&nQ 
9 a Buildings and other depreciable assets 
b Less accumulated depreciation. 
10a Deptetable assets. 
b Less accumulated depletion. 
11 Land (net of any amortization) 
12a Intangible assets (amortizable only). 
b Less accumulated amortization. 
13 Other assets (attach stmt) 
14 Total assets 
UabKtiesand Capital 
15 Accounts payable 
16 Mortgages, notes, bonds payable in less than 1 year 
17 Other awratliabtfi^ 
18 All nonrecourse loans 
19 Mortgages; notes, bonds payable in 1 
2D Omer liabilities (sOxhstii) 
21 Partners* capital accounts 
22 Total liabilities and capita] 
t j S l t i i ^ i t W i Recondiiation of Income (Loss) per Books WHh Income (Loss) per Return 
20,024. 
1 Net income (loss) per books 
2 Income included on Schedule K, lines 1 , 
2 , 3 c , 5 , 6 a , 7 , 8 , 9 a , 10, and 11, not 
recorded on books this year (itemize): 
3 Guaranteed pints (other than health insurance). 
4 Expenses recorded on books this year not included 
ai&hedule IC lines 1 through 13e, 1610), and 
16K2)C*ince): 
b Travel and . _. _ 
entertainment § 5 , 5 4 3 . 
5 Add lines 1 throuqh 4 
1 Schedule M2>l Analysis of Partners' i 
1 Balance at beginning of year. 
2 Capital contributed: a Cash 
b Property... 
3 Net income floss) per books 
4 Other increases (itemize): 
5 Add lines 1 through 4 
62,691. 
5,543. 
68,234. 
Capital Accounts 
12,000. 
62,691. 
74,691. 
! 6 Income recorded on books this year not 
included on Schedule K, lines 1 through 
11 (itemize): 
a Tax-exempt interest.. $ 
7 Deductions included on Schedule K, lines 1 through 
13e, 16Kty and 16I(2X not charged against book 
income the year Otemize): 
a Depreciation $ 
8 Add lines 6 and 7. 
9 Income (loss) (Analysis of Net Income (LossX line 1} 
SiiWactline8fromline5. 
6 Distributions: a Cash 
b Property 
7 Other decreases (itemize): 
STATEMENT 6 
8 Add lines 6 and 7. 
9 Balance at end of year. Subtract line 8 from line 5 
68,234. 
72,634. 
75,153. 
147,787. 
-73,096. 
PTP/VN34L oijosas Form 1065 (2004) 
Schedule K-1 
(Form 1065) 
Department of the Treasury 
tntemal Revenue Service 
2004 
Tax year beginning 
and erring 
_t20O* 
.2D 
Partner's Share of Income, Deductions, 
Credits, etC • See separate instructions. 
Information About the Partnership 
A Partnership's employer identification number 
87-0680281 
B Partnership's name, address, city, state, and ZIP code 
STOSEY MOTORS, LLC 
2850 PENNSYLVANIA AVE SUITE 1 
OGDEN. DT 84401-3304 
C IRS Center where partnership filed return 
OGDEN, DT 
Check if this is a publicly traded partnership (PTP) 
Tax shelter registration number, if any 
Check if Form 8271 is attached 
Information About the Partner 
G Partner's identifying number 
528-04-3993 
H Partner's name, address, city, state, and ZIP code 
RICK L STONEHOCKER 
3 9 3 0 LAMPLIGHTER WAY 
RIVERDALE, DT 8 4 4 0 5 - 2 6 2 5 
1 jXj General partner or LLC j jumitedj 
f l Rnal K-1 f l Amended K-1 OMB No. 1545-0099 
1 
Interest income 
6a 
6b] 
9b 
Partner's Share of Current Year Income, 
Deductions, Credits, and Other Hems 
Ordinary business income (loss) 
34,127. 
Net tenia) real estate income (toss) 
Other net rental income (loss) 
Guaranteed payments 
Ordinary dividends 
Qualified dividends 
Royalties 
Net short-term capital gain (loss) 
Net long-term capital gain (loss) 
Collectibles (28%) gain (loss) 
Unrecaptured section 1250 gain 
15 
16 
17 
Credits & credit recapture 
Foreign transactions 
Alternative minimum tax (AMI) items 
rnember-manager 
j Domestic partner 
K What type of entity is this partner? 
L Partner's share of profit, loss, and capital: 
Beginning 
Profit %| 
Loss 
Capital % 
Ending 
50 % 
50 % 
50 % 
M Partner's share of liabilities at year end: 
Nonrecourse $_ 
Qualified nonrecourse financing. $ 
Recourse $ 
93,120 
N Partner's capital account analysts: 
Beginning capital account $_ 
Capital contributed during the year" $ 
Current year increase (decrease) $ 
6,000 
•6,230, 
Withdrawals and distributions $ ( 7 2 , 6 3 4 . ) 
Ending capital account $ - 7 2 , 8 6 4 . 
[XJTax basis QGAAP []Sect ion 704<b) book 
Other (explain) 
13 
A 
Other deductions 
10, 
Self-employment earnings (loss) 
34,127. 
Tax-exempt income and 
nondeductible expenses 
2,771. 
Distributions 
72,634, 
Other information 
*See attached schedule for additional information. 
BAA For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see Irtstructtorts for Form 1065. 
PARTNER 1 PTPA0312L ouoaos 
Schedule K-1 f o r m 1065) 2004 
Schedule K-1 2 0 0 4 
(Form 1065) 
Department of the Treasury Tax year bety rang ,2004 | 
Internal Revenue Service 
andeorjng , 2D 
Partner's Share of Income, Deductions. 
C r e d i t s , e t c *• See separate instructions. 
[Partt^l Information About ttv 5 Partnership 
A Partnership's employer identification number 
87-0680281 
1 B Partnership's name, address, city, state, and ZIP code 
STONEY MOTORS, LLC 
2 8 5 0 PENNSYLVANIA AVE SUITE 1 
OGDEN. OT 8 4 4 0 1 - 3 3 0 4 
I C IRS Center where paiinership filed return 
1 OGDEN, UT 1 D ' 1 E1 F 1 
Check if this is a publicly traded ps 
Tax shelter registration number, if 
Check if Form 8271 is attached 
h l ^ r t B I Information About th 
rtnership (PTP) 
any 
e Partner 
1 G Partner's identifying number 
529-33-8475 
1 H Partner's name, address, city, state, and ZIP code 
JACQUELINE M STONEHOCKER 
4 6 0 3 SOUTH 4650 WEST 
WEST HAVEN, UT 8 4 4 0 1 £ + 
1 1 | j General partner or LLC JX] Limited partner onMgr j 
1 member-manager ^ " V V ^ r l % ^ * ^ 
1 J JX] Domestic partnei ^ ^ ^ n p r A n ^ r t n e r ' 
1 K Wh at type of entity is this par tner^TNDIVIDUAL 
1 L Partner's share of profit, loss, and capital: 
1 1 
1 
1 < 
M 1 
Beginning 
3 ro« % 
_oss % 
Capital % 
Ending 
50 % 
50 % 
50 % 
Partner's share of liabilities at year end: 
1 Qualified nonrecourse financing. 
1 N Partner's capital account analysis: 
1 Capital contributed during trie year 
1 Current year increase (decrease) . . . . 
1 Withdrawals and distributions 
X Tax basis []JGAAP 
Other (explain) 
. s 
. $ 
$ 
. $ 6,000-
$ 
. $ -6 ,232, 
$ 
. $ -232. 
Q s e d i o n 704(b) book 
["I Final K-1 f~l Amended K-1 OMB No. 1545-0099 
[Parting Partner's Share of Current Year Income, 1 
Deductions, Credits, and Other Items | 
i j 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6a 
6b 
7 
8 
9a 
9b 
9c 
10 
11 
Lr 
12 
13 
IA 
14 
Ordinary business income doss) 
34,127. 
Net rental real estate income (loss) 
Other net rental income (loss) 
Guaranteed payments 
Interest income 
Ordinary dividends 
Qualified dividends 
Royalties 
Net short-term capital gain (loss) 
Net long-term capital gain (loss) 
Collectibles (28%) gain (loss) 
Unrecaptured section 1250 gain 
Net section 1231 o a i n j k a ^ ^ J 
£frC_ 
Section 179 deduction 
1 Oilier deductions 
10. 
| Self-employment earnings (Joss) 
15 
16 
17 
R^ 
19 
20 
Credits & credit recapture 1 
Foreign transactions 1 
Alternative minimum tax (AMT) items 
f 1 
^Tax-exempt income and 1 
norideductible expenses 
2,772J 
Distributions 
Other information 
*See attached schedule for additional information. 1 
o 
R 
1 
R 
S 
tl 1 
s 
E j 
N 
L 
Y 
BAA For Paperwcrt Reduction Act Notkx, see 1 ^ ^ 
PARTNER 2 PTPAO312L OI/QSJOS 
Schedule K-1 (Form 1065) 2004 
(o 
2004 FEDERAL STATEMENTS PAGE 1 
CLIENT 1081601 STONEY MOTORS. LLC 874)680281 
6/03/05 02:47PM 
STATEMENT 1 
FORM 1065, UNE 20 
OTHER DEDUCTIONS 
ADVERTISING $ 2,072. 
BANK CHARGES 198. 
COMMISSIONS 34 ,067 . 
DDES AND SUBSCRIPTIONS 185. 
FUEL 6 ,919 . ! 
INSURANCE 4 , 7 9 2 . 
LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL 967. 
MEALS AND ENTERTAINMENT 5,543. 
MISCELLANEOUS 1 , 6 5 2 . 
POSTAGE 6 7 6 . 
SUPPLIES 5,532. 
TELEPHONE 3,892. 
TOTAL $ 66,495. 
STATEMENT 2 
FORM 1065, SCHEDULE A, UNE 5 
OTHER COSTS 
DETAILING & REPAIRS ^ ^ ^ 1 ^ 1 - - $ 27,953. 
f+ C \ \ TOTAL 5 ~ 27,953. 
CASH CONTRIBUTIONS -1601 TRHITATION $ 20. 
• ^ TOTAL $ 2 0 . 
STATEMENT4 
FORM 1065. SCHEDULE L, UNE 17 
OTHER CURRENT LIABILITIES 
BEGINNING ENDING 
COMISSIONS PAYABLE $ 0 . $ 3,607. 
CREDIT CARD PAYABLE-AMEX 0. 11,364. 
LINE OF CREDIT 0. 44,713. 
SALES TAX PAYABLE 0. 10,387. 
TOTAL $ (L $ 70,071. 
12004 FEDERAL STATEMENTS PAGE 2 
CLIENT 1081601 STONEY MOTORS, LLC 87-06802811 
003/05 02:47PM| 
STATEMENTS 
FORM 1065, SCHEDULE L, UNE 20 
OTHER LIABILITIES 
BEGINNING ENDING 
ZI0NS BANK $ 0. $ 23,049. 
TOTAL $ ~ 0 T $ 2X049. 
STATEMENT 6 
FORM 1065, SCHEDULE M-2, UNE 7 
OTHER DECREASES 
ADJ FOR DEBT NOT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. $ 75,153. 
TOTAL? 75,153. 
ovi *fi> 
Tab 5 
01/27/05 THU 12:17 FAI 801 956 3829 
1 ZIONS BANCORPORATION 
1 ZIONS BANCORPORATION 
1 ZIONS BANK 
6700 LOAN NUMBER 
Zlons Online Banking 
CUSTOMS HISTORY REPORT •ALRS0568 00001 
ElOO 2 
PAGE 1 
DATE 1/27/2005 
AS OF 1 /26/2005 
1 1 
01/26/05 
670(04005864 
RICK L STONEHCCKER 
3930 LAMPLIGHTER WAY 
OGDEN UT B4405-2625 
TYPE OF ACCOUNT REVOLVING CREDIT 
CREDIT LINS 45,000.00 
INTEREST RATE .05250 
AVAILABLE CREDIT LINE 286.64 
DATE DESCRIPTION 
i2/ll/00 RATE CHANGE INTEREST 
02/28/01 RC DRAW 2 
03/06/01 PMNT RECVD 
OVERAGE 
APPLIED PRINCIPAL 
APPLIED INTEREST 
05/14/01 RC DRAW 1 
05/15/01 RC DRAS 1 
06/10/01 PMNT ACH/DDA 
APPLIED INTEREST 
07/10/01 PMNT ACH/DDA 
APPLIED INTEREST 
07/11/01 PMNT RECVD 
OVERAGE 
APPLIED PRINCIPAL 
07/12/01 RATE CHANGE INTEREST 
07/24/01 INTEREST BILLED 
07/26/01 RATE CHANGE INTEREST 
08/10/01 PMNT ACH/DDA 
APPLIED INTERES? 
8/24/01 RATE CHANGE INTEREST 
ACCOUNT OPENED 
INITIAL ADVANCED 
CURRENT BALANCE 
NEXT PAYMENT DUE 
PAYMENT AMOUNT 
TRANSACTION DETAIL 
FROM .09500 
TO .07500 
800.00 
B0Q.9B 
300,93 
800.00 
0.98 
10,000.00 
35,000.00 
103.77 
103.77 
286.64 
286.64 
236,64 
286.64 
286.64 
FROM .07500 
TO .07000 
FROM 
TO 
,07000 
,06750 
FROM .06750 
TO .06500 
09/10/01 PMNT ACH/DDA 
28.97 
247.54 
247.54 
239.80 
11/27/00 
O.OO 
44,713.36 
02/10/05 
212.11 
BALANCE 
800.00 
0.00 
10,000.CO 
45,000.00 
45,000.00 
45,000.00 
44,713.36 
44,713.36 
44,713.36 
44,713.36 
Tab 6 
Stonehocker Trial 
Summary of CPA Issues/Discussion Points 
Record Keeping Issues 
Lack of a set of bookkeeping records/ledgers 
"Shoebox" of receipts - not categorized or organized, incomplete 
Use of Jackie's time to try and organize data in order to verify information 
Prohibitive cost to reconstruct and generate a set of books 
Record keeping system innacurate and unreliable 
Use of tax returns as most reliable source of information 
Information was provided by Rick to Accountant 
Many deductions lacked support 
Inappropriate deductions, especially in 2002 
Income & Business Valuation issues 
Determination that 2002 was most reliable source of data 
Divorce began in 2003 and business immediately backed off 
No reliable data for 2004, lack of organized records 
Business became independent in 2001 
Conclusion: 2002 most reliable 
2002 Adjusted for known discrepancies to arrive at accurate figures 
Methodology for valuation 
Excess earnings from business 
Calculated using normal earnings @ 40% commission rate, same used for Randy Guerriero 
Results in income to Rick of approx $78,000 per year 
Excess earnings of $68,000 
Resulting value at multiple of excess earnings of 3 = $204,000 
Industry Rule of Thumb (Self-employed service business) 
125%-150% of Onwer Discretionary income 
Discretionary income is sum of income & excess earnings noted above 
Total discretionary = $146,000 
Based on multiples range would be between $182,500 & $219,000 
Tax Return Issues 
For 2002 & 2003 - One half of business income attributed to Jackie 
Tax returns show Jackie as having received the income as distributions 
Jackie never got the money but is shown as being responsible for the taxes 
If distributions are attributed to Jackie because of expenses (mortgage, etc) paid in her behalf 
then Jackie should be entitled to deductions for mortgage interest, taxes, etc. 
Rick took deductions for these items. 
Accounting Fees 
Significant time was spent trying to determine reliability of records 
Determined that sales information could be deemed reliable 
Records were organized and summarized by Jackie then verified by us 
Determined that cost & expense records were incomplete, inconsistent 
Efforts to find consistency and accuracy were abandoned because 
it was becoming cost prohibitive. 
Rick should be responsible for record keeping 
Discussions with Altina Stott indicate she was unwilling to 
reconstruct records as well. - Cost prohibitive 
Tab 7 
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DBERT ECHARD 
k ASSOCIATES 
LAW OFFICES 
IANK BUILDING, SUITE 200 
WASHINGTON BOULEVARD 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
(801)393-2300 
FAX (801) 393-2340 
OCT y m 
Hi ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953 
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Respondent 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2491 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: 801-393-2300 
Facsimile: 801-393-2340 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
RICK L. STONEHOCKER 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
OCT 08Z003 
JAQUELINEF.M. STONEHOCKER 
Respondent. 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE 
Case No.: 024902009 
Judge: Ernie W. Jones 
Commissioner: Douglas Thomas 
The above entitled matter came on for a hearing on the Respondent's Order to Show 
Cause before Commissioner Thomas on the 10th day of September 2003, at 3:00 p.m. The 
Petitioner was present and represented by his attorney, Philip Patterson, and the Respondent 
was present and represented by her attorney, Robert A. Echard. The court having received 
documents, Affidavits and having heard proffers of evidence, and being fully informed in the 
premises, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS. 
1. The court awards the Respondent the temporary possession of home. This decision is 
based primarily on the requirement of this location. The Respondent currently resides 
P\n**) 
ROBERT ECHARD 
& ASSOCIATES 
LAW OFFICES 
BANK BUILDING, SUITE 200 I 
WASHINGTON BOULEVARD | 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
(801)393-2300 
FAX (801) 393-2340 
in the home with her son who is approximately 12 or 13 years of age and her daughter 
Ashley, who is 17 years of age and pregnant. The Petitioner is currently residing in a 
condominium. 
2. The Court has reviewed the information concerning the parties income. For the 
purposes of determining temporary family support or financial adjustments, the Court 
concludes that the Petitioner has an income of $5,625.00 after deductions of 25% 
percent taxes. The parties have a first mortgage on the home in the approximate sum 
of $2,656.89 per month, and a second mortgage on the home in the approximate sum 
of $180.00. The second mortgage sum fluctuates, but the Petitioner represented that 
it is an average of the monthly costs for the second mortgage. On a temporary basis, 
the Petitioner shall pay the first and second mortgages and shall keep those sums 
current. 
3. The Respondent shall pay the utilities on the home and shall leave the utilities in the 
Petitioner's name with the exception of the Direct TV and the phone, which shall be 
changed into the Respondent's name. 
4. The Petitioner shall make arrangements to have his mail forwarded to his new 
address, so that he will have not have to go to the home. The Petitioner shall be 
responsible for providing on a prompt basis, the bills for the utilities which are in his 
name. 
5. The parties are mutually restrained from contacting each other. Any modification of 
this no contact order must be in a written stipulation and submitted to the court for 
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signature. The Petitioner is restrained from entering or accessing the premises now 
occupied by the Respondent and her children. 
6. The Petitioner shall prepare through his attorney, a list of any personal property that 
he wants from the home and submit the list to the Respondent's attorney. The 
Respondent's attorney shall respond to that list and the personal property agreed upon 
shall be delivered to the Petitioner at the home, at a time to be agreed upon by the 
attorney's. At that specific time, the Petitioner can collect those items from the home 
will are to be placed outside of the home by the Respondent. 
7. Both parties are mutually restrained from disposing of, encumbering, or damaging 
any of their assets during the pendency of this action. 
8. The parties have attempted mediation in the past, and therefore, are not required to 
engage in further mediation prior to a Pre-Triall hearing being held in this matter. 
9. Both parties shall complete their discovery within 120 days. 
10. The records of the business being operated by the Petitioner shall be delivered the 
accountant, Roger Nuttall and the Respondent's attorney shall have access to the 
reports in the possession of Roger Nuttall and shall be permitted to communicate with 
Roger Nuttall concerning the information that he has accumulate. 
11. The Respondent currently possess and uses a 1998 Volkswagen Passat automobile. 
She shall be entitled to obtain the temporary possession of said vehicle and the 
Petitioner shall be entitled to retain the temporary possession of any vehicle that he 
uses. 
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12. The issues of attorney's fees and all other issues raised by the Order to Show Cause 
not dealt with herein are reserved. 
DATED this 6 day o£Sj 
COMMENDED BY: 
¥2003. 
A 
COUCT COMMISSIONER ns T  DATE -DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
NOTICE TO PETITIONER AND COUNSEL. 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for the Respondent will submit 
the foregoing for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice was 
mailed to you, allowing three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to 
that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administrative of 1988. 
Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED th i s^^day of September 2003. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING & FAX 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document(s), postage prepaid, to the following individual(s): 
Philip Patterson 
427 27th Street 
Ogden,UT 84401 
DATED t h i s ^ day of September 2003. 
081 
Tab 8 
1 document plus Mrs. Stonehocker saying that's what it is and 
2 then I heard something to the effect what Mrs. Stonehocker 
3 said, well, we just don't know what to do until the end of 
4 this trial. That's a corporation, separate corporate 
5 existence. It exists and is responsible to the IRS and the 
6 Utah State Tax Commission without regard to Mrs. 
7 Stonehocker's litigation (inaudible) just like Mr. Echard has 
8 argued so boisterously with Mr. Stonehocker on his tax 
9 liabilities. 
10 Well, you know - and that is why I'm saying this, 
11 with all this money and nothing corroborated, nothing every 
12 documented other than her word which Mr. Echard says and you 
13 should take it for it, we gave you documentation that what 
14 she's saying just doesn't work. 
15 Attorney's fees at $25,000 without a showing -
16 there should be a showing of need. I understand what she 
17 said about four but Judge, you just don't have any 
18 documentation on four. You sure do have it on $130,000. 
19 THE COURT: I guess the one finding I can make - I 
20 think she makes less than he does. I don't know exactly how 
21 much she makes but I do think she makes less than he does and 
22 maybe it's just a ballpark figure. I think it's around 
23 $4,000, I think he's around $10,000 or at least based on what 
24 I've seen. It seems to me that she clearly, from this case 
25 has the need for attorney's fees and he has the ability to 
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1 pay, I'm also finding - I think the attorney's fees were 
2 reasonable, I mean both of you have done an incredible job 
3 and I'm just amazed at all the exhibits and I can't imagine 
4 how much time went into the case but I do find the attorney's 
5 fees in this case are reasonable. But the other thing was 
6 his attitude. I just, I just, when I heard him say that, I 
7 just thought...I think it's a factor in requiring him to pay 
8 her attorney's fees. 
9 MR. PATTERSON: I wish I had a photograph of you 
10 that captured that moment because — 
11 THE COURT: Yeah, I was just blown away. 
12 MR. PATTERSON: I do remember your facial 
13 expression when you heard that. I think there was a head 
14 shake. 
15 THE COURT: Anyway, that's my ruling. He's going 
16 to required to pay her attorney's fees. 
17 Now, I had a couple of other issues that you 
18 raised, Mr. Patterson. One was on debts and you said - I'd 
19 ruled each party is responsible for debts and loans incurred 
20 after separation. I'd relied on Petitioner's Exhibit 41 and 
21 Respondent's 5. Then in your brief you said something about 
22 well, we may need additional documentation to determine some 
23 of those debts? 
24 MR. PATTERSON: Here's the reason why, Judge, 
25 here's the reason why I say that. If you look to the 
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1 they were married, it makes no difference how long they've 
2 been separated under the Peterson case. You can't consider 
3 that in making a determination. Thank you. 
4 THE COURT: All right. Anyway, I think I am going 
5 to make those findings that Mr. Patterson suggested which is 
6 the business possesses not good will valuation beyond the 
7 professional reputation and work product of the petitioner 
8 and the other recommendation was the finding that the value 
9 of the business was limited to the net value of its inventory 
10 and to the residual value at the least. 
11 Did you see those that he submitted, Mr. Echard? 
12 MR. ECHARD: Did I see? 
13 THE COURT: He had suggested -
14 MR. ECHARD: I understand what you just ruled and I 
15 guess I'm going to have to go back and see what the value is 
16 absent good will because I'm not sure that is delineated out 
17 (inaudible). 
18 THE COURT: All right. I think at this point, I 
19 appreciate the arguments of counsel but I'm going to leave 
20 the original order in place that, well, the ruling that I 
21 made before on the question of good will. 
22 Now the next question that I had down had to do 
23 with the home in West Haven. My original order was, of 
24 course, that we would award the home to her but it was my 
25 J intention that she be responsible for both mortgages, both 
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1 the first and the second mortgage and I know Mr. Echard you'd 
2 mentioned something about that I hadn't considered the labor 
3 that was put into the home by her father which is estimated 
4 at about $90, 000. I can tell you that's one of the reasons I 
5 gave her the home was because her father had put $90,000 
6 worth of labor into it. So I thought I had considered that 
7 gift in awarding the home to her so. And I don't know if you 
8 want to talk about this thing about the second mortgage. 
9 MR. ECHARD: I would appreciate that Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: You said something about... 
11 MR. ECHARD: May I approach, Your Honor, with an 
12 exhibit that we put in at the time of the trial and I made 
13 another copy for you. This is an exhibit we put in towards 
14 the end of the trial and it relates to the (inaudible). You 
15 may recall that there was testimony concerning the various 
16 values and the fact that he had not done the 2004 tax return. 
17 Well, they did it during the course of the trial and provided 
18 it to us. What you see here is the Stoney Motors 2004 tax 
1BJ\ return. Would you turn to the next to the last page where it 
20 says statement 4. You see the next to the last line, it says 
line of credit $44,713. That is a business debt. It is not 
22 a debt on the home. He used the home to acquire the money 
23 for the business. He reports it as a business. He's writes 
24 it off as a business. It is a business debt. 
25 Now if the Court says - and I want to talk about 
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